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The interpretation and enforcement of contract indemnity
provisions in multi-employer construction projects has gener-
ated substantial litigation in the Washington courts.' The rela-
tive frequency with which these cases arise, not to mention the
often substantial damages involved, makes them of special
interest to the practicing attorney. In particular, it is critical
that any attorney practicing in the area of construction law be
intimately familiar with the multitude of issues often associ-
ated with the litigation of construction industry indemnifica-
tion clauses.
Litigation in this area arises most often in the context of
major multi-employer construction projects. These projects
typically involve the services of a general contractor who con-
tracts directly with the owner to direct, supervise, and control
the overall project. This general contractor, in turn, engages
the services of various specialty subcontractors who undertake
to perform and complete discrete portions of the overall pro-
ject under the terms and conditions of individual subcontracts.
The duties, responsibilities, and obligations of these project-
related subcontracts are traditionally weighted heavily in favor
of the general contractor and typically include a general, all-
inclusive indemnification provision in which the subcontractor
agrees as follows:
To indemnify and save harmless the Contractor from
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1. This article focuses exclusively upon the analysis and interpretation of
indemnity provisions in the Washington courts. For a survey of cases on this issue in
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and against any and all suits, claims, actions, losses, costs,
penalties, and damages, of whatsoever kind or nature,
including attorney's fees, arising out of, in connection with,
or incident to the Subcontractor's performance of this
Subcontract.2
This type of indemnity clause clearly encompasses a wide vari-
ety of potential claims, including sub-subcontractor claims,
materialmen claims, equipment rental claims, quality of work
claims, and personal injury claims. As a practical matter, the
very breadth and all-inclusive nature of the clause invite litiga-
tion for virtually any unanticipated project related loss, dam-
age, or injury.
Despite the wide variety of potential claims encompassed
by the typical indemnification clause, the vast majority of
reported cases interpreting and enforcing construction industry
indemnity clauses involve a fairly consistent fact pattern. In
generic terms, the common scenario may be briefly summa-
rized as follows: (1) a subcontractor's employee sustains a job-
site injury; (2) the injured employee makes a claim against the
general contractor whose activities or negligence allegedly con-
tributed to the injury;3 and (3) the general contractor makes a
claim against the subcontractor (employer) under the provi-
sions of a subcontract indemnity provision. Faced with this
scenario, the Washington courts have struggled for more than
twenty years trying to develop a consistent approach to inter-
pret these clauses and seeking to impart a practical and equita-
ble interpretation within the principles of general contract law.
This struggle has resulted in significant changes in the
state of the law. In a broad sense, the chronological progres-
sion of reported decisions evidences a transition from a literal
2. See Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 521, 527 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1974);
Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035, 1036, 467 P.2d 386, 387 (1970).
Most modern indemnity provisions have been rephrased and amended to reflect, inter
alia, the considerations engendered in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1985) (indemnity
for damages deriving from the sole negligence of the indemnitee). See infra notes 155-
65 and accompanying text. For considerations relating to indemnity for the concurrent
negligence of the indemnitor and the indemnitee, see infra notes 229-63 and
accompanying text; considerations relating to industrial insurance statutes, specifically
concerning employer immunity for injuries to employees, see infra notes 169-221 and
accompanying text; and entitlement to attorney's fees in litigation involving
enforcement of the clause itself, see infra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
3. The typical case concerns a claim by the injured employee against the general
contractor under the authority of Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr., 90 Wash. 2d 323,
582 P.2d 500 (1978). Careful study and analysis of the seminal Kelley decision and its
progeny is a strict requisite for any attorney practicing in this area of law.
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and strict enforcement of indemnity clauses 4 toward a require-
ment of indemnification only upon proof of an "overt act or
omission" by the indemnitor, which causes, or participates in
causing, the original and underlying loss.5 A previous focus
upon the literal language of the clause6 has gradually surren-
dered to a more precise analytical focus upon the particular
facts and circumstances underlying the claim for indemnifica-
tion.7 More specifically, reported decisions have evolved to a
present focus upon the specific acts and activities of the indem-
nitor, and the causal relationship of these acts or omissions to
the fact of loss, damage, or injury.' However, to state the pro-
gression of reported decisions on this issue in terms of evolu-
tion does not necessarily imply complete consistency. Rather,
the very concept of evolution suggests a dynamic process, sub-
ject both to some internal inconsistency and to consequent ana-
lytical critique.
This Article develops how Washington courts historically
have interpreted construction industry indemnification clauses.
This Article first addresses the substantive and the primary
issue of liability, vel non,9 under construction industry indem-
nification provisions. This section offers a historical analysis of
Washington case law on the subject and concludes with an
analysis of the recent statutory amendments to section 4.24.115
of the Washington Revised Code,10 which substantially impact
the current state of the law and which should resolve many
unsettled or ambiguous issues in the case law.1 ' This Article
then discusses some unique issues that have arisen in the con-
text of attempts to judicially enforce these indemnification
provisions. Finally, this Article proposes a model indemnifica-
tion provision that equitably formulates the clause, taking into
4. Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1035, 467 P.2d at 386 presents perhaps the best example
of this early approach. For extended discussion of Tucci, see infra notes 42-48 and
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 518, 527 P.2d at 1115. Jones clearly represents
the seminal case in Washington on the issue and marks the judicial transition toward
the modern approach to the analysis of construction industry indemnification
provisions. Jones is discussed in detail infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1038, 467 P.2d at 388.
7. See, e.g., Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 520-21, 527 P.2d at 1118.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 16-163 and accompanying text.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) as amended by Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305,
§ 601, 1986 WASH. LEG. SERV. 6 (West). See infra text accompanying note 157 for the
text of the revised statute.
11. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
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account the precepts enunciated in Washington case law and
statutes.
By way of brief preliminary comment, it must be acknowl-
edged that indemnity and hold harmless clauses are not unique
to construction industry contracts. Washington appellate deci-
sions have addressed the validity and enforceability of indem-
nity clauses in many contexts, including property management
contracts,12 franchise agreements, 8 and lease agreements, 4 as
well as a county fair concession contract.15 To a large extent,
the courts' interpretation of clauses in these former contexts
parallels the interpretation progressively imparted to indemni-
fication clauses in construction industry contracts. In certain
circumstances, a principle first articulated in a case concerning
a construction industry indemnification clause is further devel-
oped and refined in a non-construction industry indemnifica-
tion case. For this reason, this Article discusses certain non-
construction industry cases when principles enunciated in
those cases bear upon issues and principles germane to the
interpretation of indemnity clauses in construction industry
cases. Notwithstanding this brief discussion, the primary focus
of this Article is upon the interpretation and enforcement of
indemnity clauses in construction industry contracts.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF LIABILITY
The judicial development and interpretative evolution of
construction industry indemnity clauses can be conveniently
broken down into four distinct categories. Three of these cate-
gories relate to a chronological analysis of Washington case
law; the fourth category relates to the impact of the recent
amendments to section 4.24.115 of the Revised Code of Wash-
ington upon indemnity law.'" The first of these categories
develops the line of cases culminating in Tucci & Sons, Inc. v.
12. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947)
(indemnity agreement between apartment owner and property agent upheld).
13. See, e.g., Dirk v. Americo Mktg. Co., 88 Wash. 2d 607, 565 P.2d (1977)
(indemnity clause in dealership contract did not protect the dealer from loss resulting
from his own negligence).
14. See, e.g., Calkins v. Lorraine Div. of Koehring, 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143
(1980) (indemnity clause in lease agreement did not release lessor/owner from loss
because of owner's negligence).
15. See, e.g., Parks v. Western Wash. Fair Assn., 15 Wash. App. 852, 553 P.2d 459
(1976) (although negligence is not necessary to establish liability, the indemnity clause
did not make the indemnitor strictly liable).
16. See infra text accompanying note 157.
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Madsen, Inc.,17 which promoted strict, and often inequitable,
enforcement of the indemnity provisions. The second category
focuses exclusively upon the seminal Washington Supreme
Court decision in Jones v. Strom Construction Co., 8 which
ameliorated the harsh principles enunciated in earlier cases
and first articulated the "overt act or omission" test that
remains the predicate for liability under these provisions. 9
The third category develops cases subsequent to Jones that fur-
ther address the "overt act and omission" test. Finally, the
fourth category analyzes the recent amendments to section
4.24.11520 of the Revised Code of Washington on the substan-
tive liability of a party under construction industry indemnity
clause.
A. Early Case Law: Strict Enforcement of Indemnity
Provisions
Historical analysis of relatively early case law that
enforces indemnity provisions begins with a brief review of
appellate decisions, culminating with the decision of the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals in Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Madsen, Inc.2"
1. The Historical Predicate
Although it arose outside the context of the construction
industry, Griffiths v. Broderick, Inc.22 enunciated the analyti-
cal precepts that influenced the interpretation of indemnity
provisions in the construction industry for more than two
decades. Griffiths concerned an action by an apartment owner
against a property management company for losses associated
with an injury to a tenant. The property manager based his
defense on a provision in the property management contract
that required the owner to hold the manager harmless from
"any and all loss, damage or injury to any person or persons
whomsoever, or property, arising from any cause or for any
reason whatsoever in and about said premises."23 Rejecting the
owner's contention that the contract did not unequivocally
indemnify for the consequences of the manager's negligence,
17. 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970).
18. 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115 (1974).
19. Id. at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118.
20. See infra text accompanying note 157.
21. 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970).
22. 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
23. Id. at 903, 182 P.2d at 19.
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the court enunciated the principle that continues to govern the
general interpretation of indemnification clauses to this date:
Contracts of indemnity, therefore, must receive a rea-
sonable construction so as to carry out, rather than defeat,
the purpose for which they were executed. To this end they
should neither, on the one hand, be so narrowly or techni-
cally interpreted as to frustrate their obvious design, nor, on
the other hand, so loosely or inartificially as to relieve the
obligor from a liability within the scope or spirit of their
terms.
24
The court noted that the indemnity covenant at issue "could
not be more 'sweeping and all-embracing in its terms' "25 and
held that the provision clearly contemplated a loss, damage or
injury occasioned by negligence.26 Specific language providing
indemnification for losses occasioned by indemnitee's negli-
gence was not required.
Union Pacific Railroad v. Ross Transfer Co. 2' reaffirmed
the principles enunciated in Griffiths. Union Pacific con-
cerned the interpretation of an indemnification provision
between the railroad and a general contractor. The provision
required indemnification for any loss "caused by or resulting in
any manner from any acts or omissions, negligent or otherwise,
of the Contractor. ' 29 Citing Griffiths as the only Washington
case on the issue, the court held that the language of the provi-
24. Id. at 904, 182 P.2d at 19-20 (quoting 27 Am. Jur. Indemnity § 13 (1934)).
25. Id. at 905, 182 P.2d at 20.
26. Id. at 906, 182 P.2d at 20.
27. Id. at 906-10, 182 P.2d at 20-23. The court also rejected plaintiff's alternate
contention that if the clause did provide for indemnification for the consequences of
the indemnitee's negligence, it was void as against public policy. Addressing the public
policy argument, the court distinguished cases involving common carriers wherein
courts recognized the universal rule that a common carrier could not contractually
relieve itself of liability for negligence in the performance of contracts of carriage.
Discounting the proposition that the allowance of indemnification for one's own
negligence would tend to promote negligence, the court analogized to the purchase of
liability insurance policies, the express purpose of which was to indemnify insureds
against losses occasioned by injuries resulting from their own negligence. On this
basis, the court held that it was not against public policy to contractually indemnify
against loss or injury attributable to one's own negligence.
28. 64 Wash. 2d 486, 392 P.2d 450 (1964).
29. Id. at 486, 392 P.2d at 450 (italics omitted). The injury in this case was the
death of a railroad employee, which occurred during the course of contract
performance. The parties stipulated that the joint negligence of the contractor and the
railroad was the proximate cause of the employee's death. Accordingly, the single issue
was whether the "acts or omission" language of the indemnity provision excluded
liability for losses due to concurrent negligence.
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sion required indemnification for losses due to the concurrent
negligence of the parties.3 °
Following closely upon the court's decision in Union
Pacific was Continental Casualty Co. v. Seattle,31 which con-
cerned almost identical facts and issues. The court again
upheld liability under a broadly-worded indemnification clause
requiring indemnity for losses due to any "act, action, neglect,
omission or default" on the part of the contractor, if the losses
were proximately caused by the joint negligence of the indem-
nitor and the indemnitee.32 The case is noteworthy only for
certain language regarding the interpretation of indemnity
clauses first articulated in this decision: "'Causation, not negli-
gence, is the touchstone' [of liability]. ' ' 33 This statement, identi-
fying causation and disavowing negligence as the predicate for
liability when interpreting indemnity clauses, is a principle
often repeated in subsequent decisions. 34 As discussed in more
detail below, this statement has caused some confusion and
uncertainty about the present state of the law.35
The same general circumstances and issues presented in
earlier cases arose in Cope v. J. K Campbell & Associates,36
which concerned the enforcement of an indemnity provision
requiring indemnification for all losses "arising out of or in
connection with the work to be performed under this Subcon-
tract. '37 Cope is noteworthy primarily because the provision in
its exception for losses "solely due to the fault or negligence of
the [general] Contractor"3 was the forerunner of many mod-
30. Critical to the decision was the court's perception that the exclusion of
indemnification for losses attributable to joint negligence would render the contractual
provision a "useless gesture" because there existed no claim for which the railroad
could seek indemnification except one founded at least partially upon the railroad's
own negligence. Id. at 490, 392 P.2d at 452.
31. 66 Wash. 2d 831, 405 P.2d 581 (1965).
32. Id. at 833, 405 P.2d at 582.
33. Id. at 835, 405 P.2d at 583 (quoting Buscaglia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 68
N.J. 508, 515, 172 A.2d 703, 707 (1961) (emphasis in original)).
34. See Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 521, 527 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1974).
35. In particular, the confusion engendered by this statement has returned to
haunt the court in the very recent case of McDowell v. Austin Co., 105 Wash. 2d 48,
710 P.2d 192 (1985). The singular effect of this latest decision by the Washington
Supreme Court has been to cast considerable doubt upon an otherwise fairly consistent
analytical approach to this issue of indemnification liability. See infra notes 131-153
and accompanying text.
36. 71 Wash. 2d 453, 429 P.2d 124 (1967).
37. Id. at 454, 429 P.2d at 125.
38. Id.
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ern indemnity clauses.39 In Cope, the general contractor made
a claim for indemnification against a subcontractor following a
joint settlement with the subcontractor's employee for project-
related injuries. Rejecting the then viable, but now statutorily
discredited, 40 distinction between active and passive tortfeasors
in the context of indemnification, the court noted that primar-
ily matters of contract and not of tort were at issue. Under the
authority of Union Pacific, the court required that the subcon-
tractor fully indemnify the prime contractor for the latter's
contribution to the settlement with the injured employee.41
2. Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Carl T. Madsen, Inc.'
All of the foregoing cases concerned injuries, damages, or
losses attributable, at least in part, to the negligence of the
indemnitor (subcontractor). The operative principle running
through these decisions was to enforce the indemnity clause
and to require the indemnitor to fully indemnify the indemni-
tee (contractor) for all losses sustained. The courts made no
attempt to allocate or apportion liability between the parties
based upon considerations of comparative negligence. Rather,
once triggered, the clause required complete indemnification.
This conclusion was predicated upon the perceived intent of
the parties in executing the indemnity provision and was con-
sistently held not to violate public policy. As indicated, how-
ever, in virtually all of these cases the indemnitor contributed
to the injury. Not until Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Carl T Madsen,
Inc.43 did the Washington courts address a situation in which
indemnification was demanded for losses occasioned by the sole
negligence of the indemnitee.
In Tucci, an employee of a subcontractor on a multi-
employer construction project was injured on the job. The par-
39. The exception relating to losses attributable to the sole negligence of the
indemnitee has been statutorily mandated by WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) since
its enactment in 1967.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1985).
41. Cope, 71 Wash. 2d at 456, 429 P.2d at 125-26. Although without expressly citing
the Griffiths case, the court reaffirmed the basic principle of Griffiths insofar as the
attempted public policy argument of the subcontractor was concerned: "[W]e would
add that we find no doctrine of public policy which renders unenforceable contracts to
indemnify one against the loss sustained by reason of the other's negligence even
though the party indemnified may, by his negligence, have contributed to cause the
loss or injury." Id.




ties stipulated that the injury was caused by the sole negli-
gence of the general contractor who incurred a judgment in
favor of the injured employee. In turn, the general contractor
sought indemnification from the employer by virtue of an
indemnity provision in the subcontract in which the subcon-
tractor agreed "[t]o indemnify and save harmless the CON-
TRACTOR from and against any and all suits, claims, actions,
losses, costs, penalties, and damages, of whatsoever kind or
nature, including attorneys' fees, arising out of, in connection
with, or incident to the SUBCONTRACTOR'S performance of
this SUBCONTRACT."44 The subcontractor attempted to dis-
tinguish previous cases,45 arguing that the language used in the
subcontract failed to warrant a conclusion that indemnification
was required for losses due to the indemnitee's sole negli-
gence.46 Noting that "it would be most difficult to assemble
words which describe a more comprehensive and all-inclusive
intent by the indemnitor to indemnify the indemnitee for all
losses suffered by the indemnitee, 47 the court held that an
intent to indemnify for the indemnitee's sole negligence need
not be explicitly set forth in a contract.
Clearly, the principle articulated in Tucci represents an
extreme position. It is highly doubtful that any reasonable
subcontractor contemplates or intends to impose liability under
44. Id. at 1036, 467 P.2d at 387. The quoted indemnity provision represented a
standard term in the Associated General Contractor form then in common use,
appearing as subparagraph (k) on the back of the AGC subcontract form.
45. See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
46. Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1038, 467 P.2d at 388.
47. Id. Accordingly, the court directed entry of judgment in favor of the
indemnitee and required the subcontractor to fully indemnify the general contractor
for losses and damages incurred in connection with the action by the injured employee.
Id. at 1043, 467 P.2d at 391. It will be noted that the injury in Tucci predated the
enactment of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1967), which purports to invalidate
construction contract liability for the sole negligence of the indemnitee, and the court
declined to apply the statute retroactively. Similarly, the court rejected the
subcontractor's defense that its immunity under Washington Industrial Insurance law
precluded liability. This consideration will be discussed in greater detail in a later
section. For now, it is important to note that the court predicated this conclusion upon
the distinction between a contract right to indemnification as opposed to a common-
law right to indemnification:
Invariably, when a contractual right of indemnity is the basis of the cause of
action, the courts permit recovery by a third party from an injured workman's
employer simply because the cause of action arises out of an independently
created contractual right which is totally independent of the exclusive
jurisdiction provisions of a workmen's compensation act, so long as the
compensation act itself does not prohibit such agreements.
Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1041-42, 467 P.2d at 389-90 (emphasis in original).
1986]
60 University of Puget Sound Law Review
an indemnity clause for injuries or losses from causes totally
beyond its control. Nevertheless, under Tucci this "construc-
tive" intent was imputed to the parties in an uncompromising
fashion and with unduly harsh results.
Decisions immediately following tended simply to restate
the principles enunciated in earlier cases. For example, in
Northern Pacific Railway v. National Cylinder Gas Division
of Chemetron Corp.,"8 the Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed a judgment requiring indemnity for losses incurred
through an injury to indemnitee's employee. The indemnity
provision in question required the contractor to indemnify for
all losses "arising or growing out of, or in any manner con-
nected with the work performed under" the contract, except-
ing only losses attributable to the sole negligence of the
indemnitee railroad.4 9 Despite the absence of any finding of
negligence on the part of the contractor, the court, quoting the
trial court, concluded that "the agreement was a clear under-
taking based upon causation rather than negligence or fault."'
Reiterating the language of Continental Casualty regarding
causation as constituting the touchstone of liability, the court
concluded that the trial court's finding, that the contractor's
activities in some way caused the injuries, was sufficient to
establish liability."1
In Tyee Construction Co. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tele-
phone Co.,52 however, indemnification was denied in a situation
not involving a third-party claim. 3 The case concerned a
broadly-worded indemnification clause that required the con-
tractor to indemnify the owner for any and all losses arising
from the performance of the contract. The contractor brought
suit against the owner for labor and materials expended upon
what was allegedly work beyond the scope of the original con-
tract. The owner defended, in part, upon the basis of the
indemnification provision. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's determination that this provision applied only to
third-party claims, and not to any damage caused by defects in
the indemnitee's own plans and specifications. To hold other-
wise, the court stated, would place upon the contractor the lia-
48. 2 Wash. App. 338, 467 P.2d 884 (1970).
49. Id. at 339-40 n.2, 467 P.2d at 886 n.2.
50. Id. at 343, 467 P.2d at 887.
51. Id. at 343-44, 467 P.2d at 888.
52. 3 Wash. App. 37, 472 P.2d 411 (1970).
53. Id. at 42, 472 P.2d at 414-15.
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bility of extending "blanket coverage to any mishap of any
nature arising from the conduct of the work.
5 4
The principle that indemnity clauses applied only to third-
party claims was subsequently qualified by the same panel of
the Washington Court of Appeals in Erickson Paving Co. v.
Yardly Drilling Co.5" The indemnification provision in this
case required the subcontractor to "indemnify and save harm-
less the contractor from and against any and all ... losses...
of whatsoever kind or nature . . . arising out of, in connection
with, or incident to the subcontractor's performance of this
subcontract. 5 6 In this case, indemnification was upheld for
damages sustained by the general contractor's heavy equip-
ment, damage that was arguably attributable to the joint negli-
gence of the contractor and the subcontractor.57 Holding that
the plain meaning of the indemnity provision did not limit its
application to third-party claims, and noting that the case did
not involve loss due to the sole negligence of the indemnitee,
the court held the subcontractor responsible for damage to the
general contractor's equipment.58
In a chronological context, the line of cases from (rif-
fiths59 through Erickson Paving6° extends into the early
1970's. Generally speaking, the courts strictly interpreted and
literally enforced construction industry indemnity clauses.61
Clearly, the judicial climate did not favor the interests of sub-
contractors. In 1974, however, the Washington Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Jones v. Strom Construction Co.
62
This decision fundamentally changed the court's basic
approach to the interpretation of indemnity clauses in con-
struction contracts.
B. The Winds of Change: Jones v. Strom Construction Co.:
63
the "Overt Act or Omission" Test
Jones concerned an action by the prime contractor for
indemnification against a subcontractor on a multi-employer
54. Id. at 42, 472 P.2d at 415.
55. 7 Wash. App. 681, 502 P.2d 334 (1972).
56. Id. at 684, 502 P.2d at 336.
57. Id. at 685, 502 P.2d at 337.
58. Id.
59. 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
60. Erickson Paving, 7 Wash. App. at 681, 502 P.2d at 334.
61. See, e.g., Tucci, 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970).
62. 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115 (1974).
63. Id.
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construction project. The case concerned an injury to the sub-
contractor's employee who was injured on the job when a floor
collapsed because of a lack of shoring. The general contractor
was responsible for determining whether or not the floor
needed to be shored and elected not to provide the shoring.
The sole cause of the injury was the lack of shoring under the
floor.64 The injured employee brought suit against the general
contractor who in turn sought indemnification from the sub-
contractor under an indemnity provision requiring indemnity
"from and against any and all... damages, of whatsoever kind
or nature, . . . arising out of, in connection with, or incident to
the SUBCONTRACTOR'S performance of this SUBCON-
TRACT. ' 65 Notwithstanding the failure of the general contrac-
tor to identify any act of negligence on the part of the
subcontractor that in any way contributed to the injury, the
court, under the authority of Tucci, held that the language of
the indemnity clause, as a matter of law, operated to require
indemnification.66 The trial court held that the injury in ques-
tion indisputably occurred "in connection with, or incident to,
performance of the subcontract."67
Reviewing prior Washington reported decisions on the
enforceability of construction contract indemnity clauses, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court, and, in
the process, repudiated the trend of earlier decisions toward
strict and uncompromising enforcement of such indemnity pro-
visions. Specifically, the court overruled Tucci and Griffiths
insofar as they were inconsistent with its present decision and
explained in some detail the elements required to sustain
future actions for indemnification.
In articulating the principle that became the heart of the
decision, the court discussed in general terms the logical func-
tion of such construction contract indemnification clauses,
predicating its analysis upon the presumed reasonable intent of
the parties to the contract.68 Focusing upon the relative partic-
ipation of the parties in the overall contract work, the court
64. Id. at 519, 527 P.2d at 1117. The trial court, upon the general contractor's
motion for a directed verdict, resolved the case on the issue of indemnification. In
granting this motion, the trial court considered the evidence in a light most favorable
to the subcontractor, thereby holding that the sole cause of the employee's injuries was
the negligence of the general contractor.
65. Id. at 521, 527 P.2d at 1118.
66. Id. at 519, 527 P.2d at 1117.
67. Id. at 521, 527 P.2d at 1118.
68. Id. at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118-19.
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declined to adopt an interpretation that would effectively con-
stitute the subcontractor as the insurer of the general contrac-
tor's performance. 9 The court noted that, "[a]t first blush, the
clause appears to be broad and sweeping in its language and
coverage. '"70 Nevertheless, the clause made no mention of, or
reference to, the general contractor's "performance" of the pri-
mary contract; rather, the clause required indemnification for
claims "arising out of," "in connection with," "or incident to"
the subcontractor's performance of the subcontract.7 1 On this
basis, the court held as follows:
It is, therefore, [the subcontractor's] performance of the sub-
contract, and losses 'arising' from, connected with, or inci-
dental to that performance, which forms the keystone on
which indemnity turns. Thus, it is clear that unless an overt
act or omission on the part of [the subcontractor] in its per-
formance of the subcontract in some way caused or con-
curred in causing the loss involved, indemnification would
not arise. [The subcontractor's] mere presence on the jobsite
inculpably performing its specified contractual obligations,
standing alone, would not constitute a cause or participating
cause.7
2
The significance of the Jones decision cannot be overem-
phasized. Jones represents a substantive restatement of the
governing principles of Washington law on the subject of the
enforceability of construction industry indemnity agreements.
In substance, the decision marks a significant shift in the ana-
69.
[I]t does not appear reasonable or in keeping with the overall purpose and
intent of the subcontract, to isolate and read the indemnity clause in such a
fashion as to virtually cast [the subcontractor/indemnitor] into the role of an
insurer of [the general contractor/indemnitee's] performance of its separate
and non delegated primary contractual obligations. Certainly, it could not
have been the intent of the parties in executing a subcontract, which
represented only approximately 1/20th of the overall contract price for the
project, to constitute [the subcontractor] an indemnitor of [the general
contractor] as against any and all losses or damages occurring to [the
subcontractor] or its employees as a direct and sole result of the [general
contractor's], or another of its subcontractor's negligence in the performance
of duties not delegated to [the general contractor/indemnitee]. Such an
interpretation does not appear to us to square with a realistic effort on the
part of the parties to logically allocate as between them the risk of loss arising
out of the construction project and the subcontract in question.
Id.
70. Id. at 521, 527 P.2d at 1118.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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lytical approach to the issue. Prior to Jones, the emphasis was
singularly upon the language of the provision; that is, liability
vel non was analytically derived from the breadth, scope and
substance of the language per se.13 Jones, however, shifts the
court's focus from the internal language of the clause to an
empirical analysis of the activities of the indemnitor and predi-
cates liability upon proof of a causal connection between such
activities and the injury or loss. 7 4
For example, prior to Jones, the general contractor clearly
was entitled to indemnification on the singular basis that the
employee's injury indisputably arose "in connection with or
incidental to" the activities of the subcontractor on the pro-
ject.75 The Jones decision, however, holds that it is insufficient
that the employee of a subcontractor (indemnitor) merely sus-
tain injuries in the course of performing construction activities
on the project; rather, entitlement to indemnification requires
proof that an overt act or omission on the part of the subcon-
tractor in its performance of the subcontract caused or con-
curred in causing the loss.7" Moreover, this "overt act or
omission" test engenders the requirement of culpable conduct
on the part of the subcontractor; that is, the subcontractor's
"mere presence on the jobsite inculpably performing its speci-
fied contractual obligations" does not constitute a legally suffi-
cient cause or participating cause.77
Notwithstanding that the court clearly articulated the sub-
stantive predicate for liability in future construction contract
indemnity claims, the language of the Jones decision is not
without ambiguity. In reaching its conclusion and formulating
the "overt act or omission" test, the court nevertheless contin-
ued to pay lip service to the precept in Continental Casualty:7 8
"Causation of loss is the touchstone of liability under a con-
struction contract indemnity clause, rather than negligence,
although negligence may be incidental to the cause."79
The foregoing language regarding causation is somewhat
difficult to reconcile with the clear import of the overt act or
omission test. If "non-culpable" conduct on the part of a sub-
73. See, e.g., Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1035, 467 P.2d at 386.
74. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118.
75. See, e.g., Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1035, 467 P.2d at 386.
76. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118.
77. Id. at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
78. 66 Wash. 2d 831, 405 P.2d 581 (1965).
79. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521, 527 P.2d at 1118.
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contractor in the performance of the subcontract does not, as a
matter of law, constitute a cause or a participating cause for
purposes of triggering an indemnity provision, it follows that
some culpable conduct on the part of the subcontractor is
required to trigger the indemnification provision. Culpable
conduct, by definition, requires or implies some degree of fault,
or, at the very least, some failure to adhere to recognized stan-
dards of conduct.80 This definitional construct is, of course, the
basis of negligence.
Accordingly, on the one hand, Jones appears to be saying
that some degree of culpable conduct, or negligence, on the
part of the subcontractor is required to trigger an indemnity
clause, but, on the other hand, by merely articulating the Con-
tinental Casualty principle, appears to be saying that negli-
gence is not necessarily required. The distinction is
functionally difficult to reconcile, and decisions subsequent to
Jones have failed to completely resolve the issue. In fact, the
most recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court on this
issue"' graphically emphasizes this obvious anomaly.
C. Case Law Subsequent to Jones: Culpability and
Proximate Causation
There has been a plethora of recent decisions on the
enforceability of contractual indemnity provisions both within
and without the construction industry setting. Certain recent
non-construction industry cases are of particular interest for
their refinement of the "overt act or omission test" enunciated
in Jones into the more traditional terminology of proximate or
direct causation.82 Fundamentally, indemnification cases sub-
sequent to Jones are divided into three general categories. The
first category consists of those cases that basically reiterate and
apply the Jones principle. The second category of cases
involves decisions that have reformulated the Jones test into
terms of the more traditional principles of proximate or direct
causation. The third "category" consists of a single recent case,
McDowell v. Austin Co. 83 that is worthy of particular attention
80. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 454 (rev. 4th ed. 1968): "Culpable. Blamable;
censurable; involving the breach of legal duty or the commission of a fault."
81. McDowell v. Austin Co., 105 Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985) (For further
discussion of this recent decision in the context of Jones, see infra notes 129-51 and
accompanying text).
82. See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
83. 105 Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985).
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because of its apparent inconsistency with the fundamental
principle enunciated in Jones.
1. Continued Application of the Overt Act or Omission Test
First among the non-construction industry cases is Redford
v. Seattle.84 Redford concerned an owner's claim for indemnity
against a contractor for losses sustained by reason of an injury
to the contractor's employee while performing work under the
contract. The indemnity provision required the contractor to
indemnify and to hold harmless the owner from and against
any and all liability for injury or property damage sustained by
the contractor or its employees in connection with the per-
formance of the contract "except negligence and willful mis-
conduct of [the owner].""5 Both the owner and the contractor
stipulated that they had acted negligently and that their
respective negligence was a proximate cause of the employee's
injuries.8 6 Reviewing a court of appeals' decision 7 affirming
the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, the
supreme court upheld an order of indemnification in favor of
the owner.88 In obiter dictum, the court made citation to
Jones, stating that the Jones decision "limited the scope of such
indemnification agreements to those cases in which some activ-
ity of the employer contributed to the injury."8 9
In contradistinction to the majority of post-Jones cases,
Tri-M Erectors v. Drake Co.,9 represents an unfortunate anom-
aly and rather atavistic application of pre-Jones principles.
This case concerned a claim by the general contractor on the
Kingdome Stadium project against a subcontractor. The gen-
84. 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980).
85. Id. at 200, 615 P.2d at 1286.
86. Id. at 201, 615 P.2d at 1287.
87. Redford v. Seattle, 24 Wash. App. 484, 602 P.2d 717 (1979).
88. Redford, 94 Wash. 2d at 207-08, 615 P.2d at 1287.
89. Id. at 205, 615 P.2d at 1288.
90. 27 Wash. App. 529, 618 P.2d 1341 (1980). The history of this case at the court of
appeals is somewhat confusing. The initial published decision of the court reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor, holding
that a factual issue existed as to whether the employee injury was due to the sole
negligence of the general contractor. If it were determined that it were solely
negligent, the court stated that indemnification would be prohibited. See 25 Wash.
App. 264 (1980) (not officially published). This initial opinion, however, was
subsequently withdrawn, and in a later published opinion by the same judge, the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the general contractor, holding
the indemnity provision applicable. Discussion of the substantive issues involved in
this case relate solely to the second opinion of the Washington Court of Appeals.
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eral contractor sought indemnification for costs and expenses
incurred in successfully defending a personal injury lawsuit
brought by an employee of the subcontractor for project-
related injuries.91 The indemnity provision at issue purported
to require indemnification by the subcontractor:
from all claims, suits and actions (including costs, expenses
and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Contractor or
others in defending same) . . .on account of any injury,
death or damage ... caused by or ... arising from any act or
omission of Subcontractor... in any way connected with the
performance of this Subcontract.92
Reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the general contractor, 93 the court distinguished Tri-M
from a case in which a general contractor seeks indemnifica-
tion for substantive damages or loss resulting from an injury or
accident.94 Acknowledging the viability of the Jones decision,
the court nevertheless rejected the subcontractor's defense,
which was substantially predicated upon the Jones holding.
The court reasoned that it was the attempted breadth of the
indemnity provision in Jones that resulted in a judicial con-
struction that indemnity was not required absent an overt act
or omission by the subcontractor. 95 The court noted that the
present indemnity provision did not suffer from the same infir-
mities as did the clause in Jones because the clause specifically
related indemnification to losses "caused by or arising from
any act or omission of [the] subcontractor."9 " Unfortunately,
although paying appropriate attention to the "act or omission"
language of Jones, the court does not discuss or suggest that
the subcontractor caused, or participated in causing, the
employee injury. Rather, to sustain liability, the court merely
reasoned as follows:
In contrast to the facts in Jones are those in the subject
case. Pursuant to the subcontract, Tri-M was to perform
steel rebar work. Tri-M held the rebar in place with guy
91. Tri-M Erectors, 27 Wash. App. at 529, 618 P.2d at 1341. In fact, the claim for
contribution was asserted as a counterclaim in the context of a lawsuit by the
subcontractor to recover expenses incurred in repairing damage resulting from an
accident during performance of extra work on the contract.
92. Id. at 532, 618 P.2d at 1343.
93. Id. at 531, 618 P.2d at 1342-43.
94. Id. at 532, 618 P.2d at 1343.
95. Id. at 533-34, 618 P.2d at 1344.
96. Id. at 534, 618 P.2d at 1344.
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wires. The injury to Finmore was caused by and occurred
during the process of moving these guy wires. Tri-M con-
ceded that Finmore was engaged in work, which 'involved'
the rebar cages and which 'affected' their construction. The
accident was thus 'connected with the performance' of the
subcontract and fell within the language of the indemnity
provision.
97
As evidenced from the rationale of the decision, the court
focused solely upon the consideration that the accident and the
underlying injury occurred in connection with the perform-
ance of the subcontract. The decision substantively ignores the
Jones "overt act or omission" requirement 98 and ignores Jones'
qualitative limit on the indemnitor's liability in which the sub-
contractor's inculpable performance of its contract obligations,
standing alone, does not constitute a cause or participating
cause.9 9 The only suggested explanation for this oversight is
the court's characterization of the action as a suit for damages
for defense costs as opposed to damages for actual liability.10 0
The distinction, however, is immaterial because defense costs
were specifically identified as an element of damages within
the scope of the clause. 10 Thus, these costs were substan-
tively identified with the underlying damages arising out of
any claim that could later become the basis of an indemnifica-
tion action.10 2  Accordingly, liability for defense costs is prop-
erly assessed only when there first exists a viable claim for
indemnification. To assert otherwise results in a logical and
practical anomaly.
The predicate for liability enunciated in Jones was later
strongly reaffirmed in Brame v. St. Regis Paper Co."°3 In this
case, Brame, a subcontractor's employee, was injured while
working on a construction project and filed suit against the
general contractor and the owner alleging that each was negli-
gent. The general contractor impleaded the subcontractor by
way of third-party complaint, basing its claim solely upon an
indemnification clause in the subcontract and asserting no spe-
97. Id.
98. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1118.
99. Id. at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
100. Tri-M Erectors, 27 Wash. App. at 532, 618 P.2d at 1344-45.
101. Id. Costs, expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by [the]
contractor in defending claims, suits and actions were expressly identified as an
element of damages for which indemnification was required.
102. Id.
103. 97 Wash. 2d 748, 649 P.2d 836 (1982).
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cific claim of negligence against the subcontractor."°4 The trial
court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable under
the rule enunciated in Jones."5 On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed this dismissal because of the indemnitee's failure to
allege an overt act of negligence on the part of the indemnitor
that would support a claim for indemnity under Jones.0 6
Gall Landau v. Hurlen Constr. Co.,"°7 similarly represents
continued adherence to the Jones doctrine. Gall Landau, the
general contractor on an office building construction project,
subcontracted with Hurlen to furnish and drive timber piles.
Although Hurlen performed its subcontract duties in strict
conformance to the plans and specifications, the work proved
defective. Gall Landau brought an action against Hurlen seek-
ing damages on the basis of a subcontract clause requiring
indemnification for any losses arising out of the subcontractor's
performance of the work. After reviewing prior case law on
the issue, the court restated the general principle that liability
under subcontract indemnity clauses required proof that the
loss was "caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the
indemnitor."' ' A subcontractor's mere jobsite presence and
nonculpable performance of its contract obligations does not
support a claim for indemnification.10 9 Citing to the Jones
principle, the court stated that "something more is necessary
to trigger a duty to indemnify than the subcontractor's mere
presence on the jobsite inculpably performing its specified con-
tractual obligations.'
' 10
104. Id. at 751, 649 P.2d at 837.
105. Id. at 752, 649 P.2d at 838. In rendering this decision, however, the trial court
stated that the supreme court in Jones had held the indemnity clause at issue to be per
se unenforceable. Correcting the trial court's misinterpretation of this aspect of the
Jones decision, the Brame court noted that the indemnity clause in Jones was not
necessarily unenforceable, but that Jones "limited the scope of such indemnification
agreements to those cases in which some activity of the employer contributed to the
injury." Id. at 751, 649 P.2d at 838. (quoting Redford v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615
P.2d 1285 (1979)).
106. Id. 97 Wash. 2d at 751, 649 P.2d at 837-38.
107. 39 Wash. App. 420, 693 P.2d 207 (1985).
108. Id. at 427, 693 P.2d at 211. (quoting Brame, 97 Wash. 2d at 751, 669 P.2d at
837-38). See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
109. Landau, 39 Wash. App. at 427-28, 693 P.2d at 211-12. Reliance for this
proposition was expressly predicated upon the seminal Jones decision. Because the
general contractor failed to allege that an overt act by the subcontractor contributed to
the loss, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor was
affirmed.
110. Id. at 428, 693, P.2d at 212.
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2. Refining the Concept: Toward a Traditional Model of
Proximate Causation
Although the following cases do not involve indemnity
agreements in construction industry contracts, they clearly
affect indemnification in the construction industry setting. In
some instances the cases specifically rely upon construction
industry cases, and, in particular the Jones decision, to deter-
mine liability. In all instances these cases further explain the
requirement of causation or participating causation as a prereq-
uisite to imposing indemnity liability.
A test analytically analogous to the Jones "overt act or
omission test" was applied to an indemnity agreement between
the Western Washington Fair Association and the operator of
the exclusive "snow cone" concession at the Puyallup Fair.11'
In Parks v. Western Washington Fair Assn., a fair patron was
injured when she slipped on what was allegedly ice from a
snow cone in the aisle of a grandstand. The patron brought
suit against the Fair Association, which, in turn, tendered
defense and demanded indemnification pursuant to the follow-
ing provision: "In consideration of the privileges granted by
this contract, the concessionaire agrees to protect and indem-
nify and hold harmless the Association from any and all claims
* . . [resulting] either directly or indirectly from the activities
and business of the concessionaire in connection with this
contract.""' 2
Noting that the indemnitor held the exclusive snow cone
concession at the Fair, the court acknowledged that application
of a simple "but-for" causation test mandates indemnification
because the injured party could not possibly have slipped on
ice from a snow cone if the indemnitor had not first sold the
snow cone.113 The court, however, held such a causative link to
be too attenuated. 1 4 Although negligence was not necessarily
required, the court held that "there must be some evidence of
control by the indemnitor over the instrumentality or condi-
tions causing the accident in order to impose liability to indem-
nify or defend.""' 5 This "control test" is analytically analogous
to the "overt act or omission" test enunciated in Jones; both
111. Parks v. Western Wash. Fair Assn., 15 Wash. App. 852, 553 P.2d 459 (1976).
112. Id. at 853, 553 P.2d at 460.





tests require a showing of culpable conduct on the part of the
indemnitor.
Similarly, in Dirk v. Americo Marketing Co. ,116 a U-Haul
dealer attempted to enforce an indemnity provision in a U-
Haul dealership contract in which the parent company agreed
to indemnify the dealer for losses occasioned by defects in the
U-Haul equipment. At trial, the superior court found first that
at the time of the collision the van was defective within the
meaning of the indemnification agreement;117 and second, that
the accident causing the loss resulted from the indemnitee's
negligence in towing the van.1 18 Seeking enforcement of the
indemnification clause, the plaintiff argued for application of a
simple "cause-in-fact" analysis, arguing that the accident would
not have occurred "but-for" the defective van being stalled on
the side of the road." 9 Under the authority of Jones, the trial
court strictly construed the indemnity clause against the
indemnitee and in favor of the indemnitor, finding that the
phrase "occasioned by" meant "caused by."12  The court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that a simple "but-for" cau-
sation analysis applied and instead required a more direct
causal relationship.12' Affirming the decision of the superior
court, the Washington Supreme Court analyzed the factual cir-
cumstances and applicable law under the principles enunciated
in Jones:
In Jones v. Strom Construction Co ..... this court inter-
preted a hold-harmless clause indemnifying the contractor
from all claims 'arising out of,' 'in connection,' or 'incident
to' the subcontractor's 'performance.' This is broader lan-
guage than 'occasioned by.' This court held that 'unless an
overt act of omission' on the part of the subcontractor
'caused or concurred in causing the loss involved, indemnifi-
cation would not arise.' In Jones, the contractor's negligence
116. 88 Wash. 2d 607, 565 P.2d 90 (1977).
117. Id. at 608-09, 565 P.2d at 91. The underlying loss which prompted the claim
for indemnification arose out of the rental of a U-Haul van in Seattle, Washington, by
a private party. The van became disabled on a journey to Eastern Washington.
Plaintiff was the authorized U-Haul dealer in the area and proceeded to pick up the
van where it had been left on the roadway and tow it into its own service station. In
the process of the towing operation, the van was struck by a vehicle, the occupants of
which made claim against the dealer who, in turn, settled the suits and commenced an
action for indemnification against the parent company.
118. Id. at 610, 565 P.2d at 91-92.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 613, 565 P.2d at 93.
121. Id. at 612, 565 P.2d at 93.
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was the sole cause of the accident. The court observed that
the accident would not have happened but for the subcon-
tractor's presence on the job; however, this was not suffi-
cient to constitute a 'cause' of the accident. The respondent
compares Jones to this case, arguing that, although the acci-
dent would not have happened unless the defective van was
on the roadside, the defect is a remote and indirect cause of
the accident; that the negligence of the appellant, was the
direct cause of the accident. We essentially agree with
respondent's analysis although we note that it is inexact to
the extent that it is comparing a situation of no culpability
(the subcontractor) to a situation of remote culpability (the
defective van).
In Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Carl T Madsen, Inc .... the
Court of Appeals held that, under an indemnity clause
which was nearly identical to that in Jones, the subcontrac-
tor agreed to indemnify the contractor for losses sustained
by the indemnity even though such loss may be occasioned
solely by the negligence of the indemnitee. The court found
that, if the employee had not been working pursuant to the
subcontract, he would not have been injured, using the 'but
for' rationale urged by the appellant here. While this
authority would be most helpful to appellant's position, it
was specifically overruled in Jones insofar as it was inconsis-
tent with Jones.
122
Properly analyzed, Dirk imposes a stricter burden of proof
upon a party seeking contractual indemnification. Not only is
proof of culpable conduct required, but the indemnitee must
prove that the culpable conduct had a direct and proximate
causal relationship to the loss. 123
Finally, Jefferson County sought indemnification against
Puget Sound Power & Light Company when a citizen, injured
in an accident, sued the county in Scruggs v. Jefferson
County.12 4  The plaintiff's car struck a utility pole owned and
maintained by the power company under a franchise agree-
ment with the county and brought suit against both the county
and Puget Power alleging negligence. The court of appeals
denied indemnification, accepting the trial court's finding that
122. Id. at 611-12, 565 P.2d at 92-93 [citations omitted].
123. Id. at 612, 565 P.2d at 93. The Dirk decision also predicated a denial of
liability for indemnification upon the general principle that indemnification will not
lie for losses resulting from the negligent acts of the indemnitee unless such intention
is expressed in unequivocal terms in the contract.
124. 18 Wash. App. 240, 567 P.2d 257 (1977).
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the accident was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff
driver and by the county's failure to post a speed limit sign, not
by the mere presence of the power pole.12 The court deter-
mined that the power pole was a condition and not a cause of
the accident. 26 Even under a "but-for" analytical approach to
causation, "[a]t most, the pole was merely a passive,
nonculpable cause-in-fact of the injuries.' ' 27  Consequently,
only an indirect causal relationship existed between the power
pole and the county's loss, such that the type of loss incurred
was not contemplated by the indemnity clause in question. 28
3. McDowell v. Austin Co.: Tucci Revisited
The primary significance of the Jones decision is the radi-
cal change in the court's analytical approach to liability vel
non. Previous case law tended to singularly predicate liability
upon the language of the provision itself. 29 Jones, however,
focused upon the activities of the indemnitor. 30 and his causal
relationship, if any, to the underlying loss or injury.'3 ' Cases
following Jones generally recognized, 32 and often refined, 33
this analytical approach. Unfortunately, the latest appellate
decision on this issue, McDowell v. Austin Co.,' 34 casts some
doubt upon the continued efficacy of the Jones analysis.
Although the case substantively turns upon the relatively nar-
row question of whether an intent to indemnify for concurrent
negligence must be specifically addressed in the agreement,
35
125. Id. at 244, 567 P.2d at 259-60.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 244, 567 P.2d at 260. The decision also predicated a denial of
indemnification upon the "rule that an indemnity contract will not be construed to
indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting to him through his own negligent
acts where such contention is not expressed in unequivocal terms."
129. See, e.g., Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1035, 467 P.2d at 386.
130. Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 521-22, 527 P.2d 1115, 1118-19
(1974).
131. Id.
132. See generally supra notes 82-109 and accompanying text.
133. Various cases subsequent to Jones, particularly in the non-construction
industry context, tended to refine the Jones concept of causative participation in the
loss into more traditional concepts of negligence and proximate causation. See supra
notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
134. 105 Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985).
135. The court held that language requiring indemnification for "all liability"
encompassed liability for concurrent negligence. For additional discussion of this issue
in McDowell, see infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
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the actual language of the decision and its implications tran-
scend this narrow issue.
McDowell involved an injury to a subcontractor's employee
that resulted in a claim against the general contractor. The
general contractor sought indemnification from the employer
under a subcontract provision purporting to require such
indemnification "against all liability for personal injury, ...
sustained by any person.. . employed by the subcontractor...
caused . . . by an act or omission, negligent or otherwise, by
owner or [general] contractor."'36 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the subcontractor, reasoning that the provi-
sion's language did not require indemnification for injuries
caused by the concurrent negligence of the parties.137  On
appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed,' 38 holding
that the indemnity provision encompassed any liability,
including liability attributable to concurrent negligence. 39
The employer appealed to the Washington Supreme Court,
arguing that the language of the clause was "ambiguous on the
issue of indemnification against concurrent negligence,"'4 ° and
that the clause was unenforceable "because it fails to express
clearly an intent [to] ... indemnify.., in circumstances of con-
current negligence."''
136. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 49-50, 710 P.2d at 193 [emphasis added in original].
A second independent indemnity provision in the subcontract obligated the employer
to indemnify the general contractor for injuries sustained by others, i.e., non-
employees, if the injuries were caused by the employer, regardless of concurrent or
other causation by anyone else, including the general contractor. Id. at 50, 710 P.2d at
193.
With regards to the employee's injury, the general contractor and employer jointly
contributed toward the settlement of this claim, and then sought recovery of amounts
respectively paid by them to the employee by way of such settlement. The case was
resolved at the trial court level upon cross-motions for summary judgment. Id.
137. McDowell v. Austin Co., 39 Wash. App. 443, 447, 693 P.2d 744, 747 (1985).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 450, 693 P.2d at 748. However, the court held that there existed a
factual question as to the cause of injury. If the injury were determined to have been
proximately caused by the sole negligence of the general contractor, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.115 (1985) would operate to invalidate the indemnity provision. Id. at 452-53, 693
P.2d at 750. The case was accordingly remanded for resolution of this material issue of
fact. Id. The prospective effect of this statute upon construction industry indemnity
provisions, and the McDowell case in particular, is discussed in greater detail see irnfra
notes 152-163 and accompanying text.
140. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 51, 710 P.2d at 194.
141. Id. at 52, 710 P.2d at 194. McDowell addressed the specific issue of
indemnification for injuries resulting from the concurrent negligence of the parties,
which is discussed in greater detail in another section of this article. See infra text
accompanying notes 234-36. At present, however, it suffices to note that the court held
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The fairly narrow ratio decidendi of the case is not partic-
ularly problematic in terms of either analytical approach to
resolution of the issue. It is, however, clearly inconsistent with
the principles and approach articulated in Jones.
142
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the decision is the
court's continued reliance upon the old Continental Casualty
principle, "[c]ausation, not negligence, is the touchstone" of lia-
bility.143 Although Jones articulated this statement, the princi-
ple that flows from it is difficult to reconcile with the
substance of the Jones decision.4 The McDowell court, how-
ever, employs the Jones principle to return to an analytical
approach that focuses upon the indemnity agreement's lan-
guage rather than an approach that focuses on the "reason-
able," albeit presumed, "overall purpose and intent' 'x45 of the
parties, analyzing that intent in the context of the parties'
activities. In particular, McDowell focuses upon the provision's
language of indemnification against "liability.' 1 46 Although
the court does not specifically address the linguistic dissimilar-
ity between this language and the more commonly encoun-
tered language that provides indemnification for "suits, claims,
actions, losses, costs, penalties, and damages,"'14 it implicitly
makes a substantive distinction between such language in its
following analysis of liability:
Parties are free to establish liability instead of negligence as
the triggering mechanism of an indemnity contract ...
Here, [the provision] provides by its terms that any liability
borne by [the general contractor] that was caused-or alleg-
edly caused-by [the general contractor's] conduct triggers
[the employer's] duty to indemnify [the general contractor]
completely. The trigger operates independently of how [the
general contractor's] conduct caused the liability.
1 48
The most striking aspect of the above language is its fail-
that the language of the provision in question encompassed circumstances involving
concurrent negligence.
142. Because the actual holding of the case may be narrowly construed, advocates
of a continued application of the Jones principle may regard the following as obiter
dicta.
143. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 51, 710 P.2d at 194. See also supra text
accompanying notes 31-5 and 75-9 for further discussion of this issue.
144. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
145. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
146. 105 Wash. 2d at 53-54, 710 P.2d at 195.
147. See Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521, 527 P.2d at 1118.
148. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 51-52, 710 P.2d at 194.
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ure to consider the subcontractor's causal relationship to the
injury. That is, indemnification is triggered independently
from any analysis of the employer's causal participation in the
underlying loss. This analysis, of course, is inconsistent with
the analytical approach undertaken by the court in Jones who
faced similar circumstances. The decision's operative effect
casts the subcontractor as the virtual insurer of the general
contractor for injuries to the subcontractor's employees. 149 In
substance, McDowell clearly engenders subcontractor liability
far beyond that contemplated by Jones. For example, under
McDowell, an injury to the subcontractor's employee would
constitute the basis of a claim for indemnity against the
employer when attributable solely to the negligence of a third-
party subcontractor, or to the joint negligence of the general
contractor and a third-party subcontractor. The Jones analysis
creates exceptions to this rule.150  By failing to consider the
employer's conduct and, further, by rejecting the necessity for
any causal connection between the employer's act or omission
and the injury, the court greatly expanded the scope of a sub-
contractor's potential liability on multi-employer construction
projects.151
149. In Jones, the court denied the general contractor indemnity for several
reasons. First, the clause dealt only with the subcontractor's performance and not
with the performance [or non-performance] of the general contractor. See Jones, 84
Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118. Secondly, the language of the clause in Jones was
ambiguous and was drafted by the general contractor. Id.; accord Madsen v. Babler, 25
Wash. App. 880, 610 P.2d 958 (1978). Finally, the percentage of the general contract
attributable to the subcontractor was small. Id.
In McDowell, however, the subcontractor was at fault, and the language of the
clause was unambiguous. 105 Wash. 2d at 51-2, 710 P.2d at 194. This is exemplified by
dicta in the decision relating to the issue of indemnification for concurrent negligence,
wherein the court states: "In this situation, the Calkins rule is not necessary for
notifying [the employer/subcontractor] of its role as insurer for the indemnitee's
liability." Id. at 53, 710 P.2d at 195.
150. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
151. One additional consideration concerning the McDowell decision is worthy of
parenthetical note inasmuch as it is indicative of the general focus of the decision. The
consideration relates to a statement by the court of the function of indemnity
agreements in the construction industry as follows: "Parties rely on indemnity
agreements for allocating the responsibility to purchase insurance when a construction
project is initiated." McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 54, 710 P.2d at 196. This statement, of
course, constitutes dictum and may represent no more than careless drafting on the
part of the author of the opinion. In and of itself, the statement is obviously
inconsistent with the general rule that "the fact that the defendant carries liability
insurance is completely immaterial on the main issue of liability .... " Williams v.
Hofer, 30 Wash. 2d 253, 265, 191 P.2d 306, 312 (1948). Thus, the unwarranted intrusion
of this statement into the analysis is juristically problematical. More important,
however, is the mere fact that the court would employ this consideration to justify the
Construction Contract Indemnification
D. Section 4.24.115 of the Revised Code of Washington:
1986 Amendments
Notwithstanding the clear import of the Jones decision
upon construction industry indemnification, considerable con-
fusion continued to exist in the case law regarding the required
causal relationship between the acts or omissions of the indem-
nitor and the underlying injury or loss.152 The existing confu-
sion should be substantively resolved with the recent
enactment of statutory amendments to section 4.24.115... of
the Revised Code of Washington. Although the statutory
amendments address a variety of issues relating to construction
industry indemnification in general," 4 they particularly and
directly apply to the basic issue of liability per se.
Prior to the 1986 statutory amendments, section 4.24.115 of
the Revised Code of Washington, a section restricted to con-
struction contracts, was relatively limited in scope on the issue
of indemnification. Section 4.24.115 provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding
purporting to indemnify against liability for damages arising
out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused
by or resulting from the sole negligence of the indemnitee,
his agents or employees is against public policy and is void
and unenforceable.
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result reached in the decision. In any event, the decision does not bode well for future
litigants resisting enforcement of construction industry indemnification agreements.
152. Compare, e.g., Brame v. St. Regis Paper Co., 97 Wash. 2d 748, 649 P.2d 836
(1982) (requiring the pleading of subcontractor's negligence); Gall Landau v. Hurlen
Constr. Co., 39 Wash. App. 420, 693 P.2d 207 (1985) (requiring the pleading of
subcontractor's negligence), with McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 48, 710 P.2d at 192; Tri-M
Erectors v. Drake Co., 27 Wash. App. 529, 618 P.2d 1341 (1980).
153. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) (Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305 § 601, 1986
Wash. Leg. Serv. 6 (West)). See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text. The statute also addressed
issues relating to indemnification for acts of concurrent negligence, and the industrial
insurance immunity of subcontractor employers.
155. Interestingly, at least two Washington superior courts held the 1967
enactment to be unconstitutional as violative of WASH. CONST. art. II, § § 19 and 38,
which respectively prohibit a bill from containing more than one subject and disallow
any amendment to a bill which changes the scope and object of the bill. See, e.g., Jones
v. Strom Constr. Co., No. 204145 (Pierce County Sup. Ct. October 17, 1972); Glen Falls
Ins. Co. v. Vietzke, No. 696543 (King County Sup. Ct. July 29, 1969). At the appellate
court level, both Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 518-20, 527 P.2d at 1117, and Tri-M Erectors, 27
Wash. App. at 534 n.2, 618 P.2d at 1344 n.2, acknowledged questions concerning
constitutionality of the statute. These questions, however, are likely resolved with the
substantial reenactment of the statute in the 1986 legislative session.
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Despite the potentially severe impact of the 1985 statute
on construction industry indemnification, no reported cases
exist in which the statute was employed to invalidate an
indemnity clause or to deny indemnification. This fact is
largely attributable to the construction industry's immediate
amendment of their indemnity provisions in standard forms to
exclude indemnity for damages caused by the sole negligence
of the indemnitee. An additional factor is the Washington
appellate courts' consistent refusal to apply the statute to the
actual language of indemnity provisions. Instead, the courts
only applied the statute in an ex post facto or empirical sense,
requiring factual circumstances of sole negligence by the
indemnitee as a predicate for the statute's application. 56
Although the statute purported to identify circumstances in
which an indemnity provision is unenforceable, it did not
address the particular issue most troublesome to the courts.
That is, it did not address the particular facts and circum-
stances under which indemnification was and should be
required.
The 1986 statutory amendments substantially alleviate this
shortcoming, and should provide clear future direction to judi-
cial decision makers. As amended, the statute in its entirety
now reads as follows:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or
in connection with or collateral to, a contract or agreement
relative to the construction, alteration, repair, addition to,
subtraction from, improvement to, or maintenance of, any
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation, or other struc-
ture, project, development, or improvement attached to real
estate, including moving and demolition in connection there-
156. The court of appeals' decision in McDowell v. Austin Co., 39 Wash. App. 443,
693 P.2d 744 (1985) exemplifies this approach. In this case, the indemnity clause
required indemnification "against all liability... caused .... by an act or omission,
negligent or otherwise by [indemnitee] .... " Id. at 445, 693 P.2d at 745-46. Despite the
obvious intent of the clause to require indemnification for damage attributable to the
negligence, including the sole negligence, of the indemnitee, the court declined to
invalidate the clause under the statute. Rather, the case was remanded for resolution
of the factual issue concerning the cause of injury. Upon remand, if the injury was
determined to have been caused by the sole negligence of the indemnitee, "RCW
§ 4.24.115 would invalidate the indemnity agreement." Id. at 453, 693 P.2d at 750. If,
however, the injury did not result from the sole negligence of the indemnitor,
indemnification would be required. Id. at 452, 693 P.2d at 750. Thus, the impact of the
statute was determined not by analysis of the language of the provision (i.e.,




with, purporting to indemnify against liability for damages
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property:
(1) Caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of
the indemnitee, his agents or employees is against public pol-
icy and is void and unenforceable;
(2) Caused by or resulting from the concurrent negli-
gence of (a) the indemnitee or the indemnitee's agents or
employees, and (b) the indemnitor or the indemnitor's
agents or employees, is valid and enforceable only to the
extent of the indemnitor's negligence and only if the agree-
ment specifically and expressly provides therefore, and may
waive the indemnitor's immunity under industrial insurance,
Title 51 RCW, only if the agreement specifically and
expressly provides therefore and the waiver was mutually
negotiated by the parties. This subsection applies to agree-
ments entered into after the effective date of this 1986
section.1
57
As amended, the statute provides that an indemnity provision
is valid and enforceable "only to the extent of the indemnitor's
negligence."15 In this regard, the statute represents a clear
affirmation of the principles and holding articulated in Jones
that required causal participation of the indemnitor in the
injury.15
9
Alternatively, the amended statute rejects the holdings
and analytical approach engendered in the Tri-M Erectors
1 60
and McDowell11 decisions. The amended statute compels judi-
cial focus on the acts or omissions of the indemnitor and, more-
over, mandates that this analytical focus be framed in terms of
traditional negligence principles. 6 2  Thus, the statutory
amendments are a significant legislative victory for the subcon-
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) (Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305 § 601, 1986
WASH. LEG. SERV. 6 (West)).
158. Id.
159. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 521-22, 527 P.2d at 1117-18.
160. Tri-M Erectors, 27 Wash. App. at 531-33, 618 P.2d at 1344-45. See supra notes
90-102 and accompanying text.
161. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 49-50, 710 P.2d at 194-95. See supra notes 129-151
and accompanying text.
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1985). The concept of negligence, of course,
contemplates not only some degree of culpable conduct, but the element of proximate
cause. In this regard, the courts would be well advised to pay careful attention to the
earlier decisions of Dirk v. Americo Mktg. Co., 88 Wash. 2d 607, 555 P.2d 90 (1977),
Scruggs v. Jefferson County, 18 Wash. App. 240, 567 P.2d 257 (1977), and Parks v.
Western Wash. Fair Assn., 15 Wash. App. 852, 553 P.2d 459 (1976), insofar as these
decisions address in some detail the concept of proximate causation in the context of
indemnification issues. See supra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
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tracting industry. In any event, the amended statute certainly
provides a more equitable allocation of risk between general
contractors and subcontractors on multi-employer construction
projects. 63
III. SPECIFIC ISSUES IMPACTING THE APPLICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
Section II of this Article has focused exclusively upon an
analysis of liability vel non under construction industry indem-
nity provisions, discussing in some detail the particular circum-
stances that give rise to liability under these provisions. As
evidenced by the chronological progression of Washington case
law, our courts gradually moved from an approach requiring
strict, literal enforcement of these provisions'6 toward a more
realistic and practical approach, which focuses on the causal
participation of the indemnitor in the underlying loss. 16 5 This
approach recently received legislative approval in the 1986 stat-
utory amendments to section 4 .2 4 .1 1 5 166 of the Revised Code of
Washington. Additional factors and legal considerations, how-
ever, affect the determination of liability. Accordingly, this
section of the Article discusses some of the additional consider-
ations impacting the enforcement of indemnity provisions in
the construction industry.
A. Industrial Insurance Act: Employer Immunity
A major and recurrent issue in construction industry
indemnity cases is the enforceability of the indemnity provi-
sion vis-a-vis the employer immunity afforded by the Washing-
ton Industrial Insurance Act. 167  These cases are discussed
163. Clearly, the amended statute removes the subcontractor from the role of
"insurer" for the general contractor's performance of the overall project. See, e.g.,
Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118-19. Cf. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 53, 710
P.2d at 194. Fundamentally, in the language of Jones, the effect of the statute would
appear to "square with a realistic effort on the part of the parties to logically allocate
as between them the risk of loss arising out of the construction project and the
subcontract in question." Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
164. See Tucci & Sons, Inc. v. Madsen, Inc., 1 Wash. App. 1035, 467 P.2d 386 (1970).
165. See Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 518, 527 P.2d at 1115.
166. See supra text accompanying note 157.
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1985). The obvious conflict between the issues
of industrial insurance employer immunity and contractual indemnification provisions
has been succinctly stated by the Washington Supreme Court as follows:
The Industrial Insurance Act, RCW Title 51, is a strong public policy
statement toward limiting an employer's liability for their employees' job-
related injuries. Indemnity provisions operate to circumvent the provisions of
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under three general headings: claims for indemnification in
the absence of a contractual indemnity provision; claims for
indemnification on the basis of a contractual indemnity provi-
sion and, in particular, the degree of specificity required to
waive the employer's industrial insurance indemnity;16 and
claims for indemnification under Washington's relatively new
tort contribution statute.
16 9
1. Non-Contractual Claims for Indemnification
Against Employers
Virtually without exception, the courts hold that an
employer's duty to indemnify a third party for injury to an
employee will not be implied in the absence of a contract
between the parties. Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum 70 con-
cerned an action by an injured employee against a third-party
lessor of property for his alleged failure to properly maintain
the premises. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the
third party was not entitled to indemnification from the
employer because the Washington Industrial Insurance Act
established statutory compensation as the sole remedy against
an employer and barred any remedy of common law. 7' On
appeal, the court framed the issue in language formulated by
Larson in his treatise on workman's compensation as follows:
"[W]hether a third party in an action by the employee can get
contribution or indemnity from the employer, when the
employer's negligence has caused or contributed to the
injury. "172
Noting strong policy arguments for the positions of both
the act by allowing an employer's liability for its employees' job-related
injuries. In general, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 grants tort immunity to
employers and, in exchange, gives employees sure and certain relief for any
job-related injury. Indemnity provisions operate to circumvent the provisions
of the act by allowing employers to be ultimately liable for tort damages
resulting from an employee's job-related injury. Thus, indemnity provisions
in effect waive the immunity of the Industrial Insurance Act. WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.04.060, however, voids pro tanto any attempt by an employee or
employer to exempt themselves from the benefits or burdens of the Act.
Brown v. Prime Constr. Co., 102 Wash. 2d 235, 238, 684 P.2d 73, 75 (1980).
168. The statutory amendments to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) specifically
address this issue. See supra text accompanying note 157. See also infra notes 208-13
and accompanying text.
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (1985).
170. 10 Wash. App. 630, 519 P.2d 22 (1974).
171. Id. at 632-33, 519 P.2d at 24-26.
172. Id. at 630-31, 519 P.2d at 23.
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the claimant and the employer, the court, nevertheless,
affirmed the decision of the trial court and denied indemnifica-
tion.1 7 3 The court discussed in some detail the overriding pol-
icy reasons engendered in the provisions of the Industrial
Insurance Act and held: "An indemnity will not exist in this
state in the face of the Industrial Insurance Act in the absence
of a contract between the indemnitor and indemnitee."'74  The
court, however, did not reach the specific issue of whether a
contract must contain a specific written indemnity provision as
a sine qua non for recovery. 175  Rather, the decision stands
merely for the proposition that indemnity will not be implied
against an employer in the absence of contract.'76
2. Contract Waivers: Specificity of Intent
Clearly, an action for indemnification predicated upon an
employer's negligence will not lie at common law in the face
of the immunity afforded employers under the Industrial
Insurance Act.177  A different issue is presented, however,
when an employer is obligated by contract to indemnify a third
party for injuries to an employee. As a general rule, the Wash-
ington courts enforce the employer's contractual liability
under such circumstances,'7 8 but have not been in complete
agreement as to the degree of specificity required in the con-
tract language to effectively waive the employer's industrial
insurance immunity.179 Recent developments, such as Brown
v. Prime Construction Co.,180 moderate the uncertainty on this
issue. The 1986 amendments to section 4.24.115 of the Revised
Code of Washington further address, and likely resolve, the
173. Id. at 639, 519 P.2d at 28.
174. Id. at 635-36, 519 P.2d at 26.
175. Id. at 635, 519 P.2d at 26.
176. See also, Seattle-First v. Shoreline Concrete, 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308
(1978) (employer immunized when participating in industrial insurance); Davis v.
Niagara Machine, 90 Wash. 2d 342, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978) (no intention to create third
party beneficiary); Olch v. Pac. Press & Shear, 19 Wash. App. 89, 573 P.2d 1355 (1978)
(mere purchase of equipment does not waive immunity).
177. See Montoya, 10 Wash. App. at 634-35, 519 P.2d at 26.
178. See Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1038, 467 P.2d at 388. See also Stocker v. Shell Oil
Co., 105 Wash. 2d 546, 716 P.2d 306 (1986) (duty to indemnify prevails over borrowed
servant defense).
179. Compare, e.g., Calkins v. Lorraine Div. of Koehring, 26 Wash. App. 206, 613
P.2d 143 (1980) (specific language required) with Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc., 36
Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790 (1983) (express waiver not required).
180. 102 Wash. 2d 235, 684 P.2d 73 (1984).
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issue. Nevertheless, the development of the court's approach
to this issue over the years is of interest.
The issue was first squarely presented in Tucci & Sons,
Inc. v. Madsen, Inc.' when the indemnitor argued that the
"exclusive jurisdiction" provisions of the Washington Indus-
trial Insurance Act operated to invalidate any employer agree-
ment purporting to waive the employer's immunity under such
statute.182 The court flatly rejected this position, noting a clear
distinction between the common-law right to contribution from
a negligent employer and a demand for contractual indemnity
not necessarily predicated upon negligence:
Invariably, when a contractual right of indemnity is the
basis of the cause of action, the courts permit recovery by a
third party from an injured workman's employer simply
because the cause of action arises out of an independently
created contractual right which is totally independent of the
exclusive jurisdiction provisions of a workmen's compensa-
tion act, so long as the compensation act itself does not pro-
hibit such agreements.1
8 3
Acknowledging an apparent statutory prohibition against an
employer waiving the benefits of the Industrial Insurance
Act,L8 4 the court nevertheless determined that the law "was
not intended to prevent an employer from making special pro-
visions for an injured employee beyond those which the
employee might receive under the workmen's compensation
act."'8 5 Accordingly, without extended analysis or discussion,
the court held that the industrial insurance statute did not pre-
clude enforcement of the indemnity provision.1
81
The first Washington decision to raise the issue of the
specificity required of language in an indemnity provision to
181. 1 Wash. App. at 1039-43, 467 P.2d at 388-91.
182. Id. at 1035, 467 P.2d at 386. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
183. Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1040-41, 467 P.2d at 389-90. See also Redford v. Seattle,
94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980).
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.060 (1986). See also supra note 167.
185. Tucci, 1 Wash. App. at 1042, 467 P.2d at 390.
186. Id. at 1043, 467 P.2d at 391. The court, however, did not specifically address
the specificity required in contract language to waive industrial insurance immunity;
rather, this conclusion was assumed to follow from the general principal that such
immunity could be waived by the contract. Similarly, the general issue of the waiver
of an employer's Industrial Insurance immunity was addressed in Jones v. Strom
Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 521-22, 527 P.2d 1115, 1117-18 (1974), which concerned the
interpretation and application of an indemnity provision identical to that in Tucci.
Jones, however, also assumed the sufficiency of the language of the clause to operate
as a waiver of the employer's immunity, contingent only upon proof of an overt act.
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effectively waive an employer's industrial insurance immunity
was Calkins v. Lorraine Division of Koehring.'8 7 Calkins con-
cerned an injury to a lessee's employee and the injured
employee's action against the lessor alleging that the crane's
defective condition was a causative factor in the injury. The
lease agreement inclusively obligated the employer to indem-
nify the lessor for injury to workmen caused by the operation,
handling or transportation of the equipment. Defending
against a claim for indemnity under the lease provision, the
employer asserted that the Industrial Insurance Act immu-
nized the company from any liability for injury to an employee
notwithstanding the contractual indemnity provision. Thus the
employer argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the
indemnity claim.' Analyzing the lease provision, the court
identified a strong public policy "disfavor[ing] agreements pur-
porting to deprive an employer of the immunity provided by
the Industrial Insurance Act."1" 9 To operate as a valid and
effective waiver of industrial insurance immunity, the court
accordingly held that "such an intent should be clearly
expressed in the agreement."1 90 Because the provision "did not
expressly state an intent to deprive [the employer] of his
immunity under the Industrial Insurance Act," the clause
failed to effectively waive the employer's immunity.1 9 '
In both Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc.,192 and Jones v. Bay-
ley Construction,93 the subcontract indemnity provision obli-
gated the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor against
damages caused by the work of the subcontractor, except for
those damages caused by the sole negligence of the contractor.
In both cases, the subcontractor indemnitor resisted enforce-
ment of the provision, in part, because the contract failed to
waive the employer's industrial insurance immunity. Rejecting
this defense, however, Division I of the Washington Court of
Appeals held that, although public policy requires a clear
expression of intent to waive the employer's immunity, "an
187. 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 (1980).
188. Id. at 208, 613 P.2d at 144.
189. Id. at 209, 613 P.2d at 145.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 210, 613 P.2d at 145.
192. 36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790 (1983) (subcontractor's employee fell off
scaffold and contractor and subcontractor stipulated to concurrent negligence).




express waiver of immunity is not required . *..."' In both
cases, the appellate court held that the indemnity clause
"clearly expresses an intent to provide for indemnification"
sufficient to operate as a waiver of the employer's industrial
insurance immunity.' 95
Recent pronouncements from the Washington Supreme
Court on this particular issue came in Brown v. Prime Con-
struction Co..196 Brown substantially alleviated the potential
inconsistency represented, on one hand, by the Calkins 9 7 deci-
sion, and on the other hand, by the decisions in Noia and Bay-
ley Construction. The facts involved an injury to a
subcontractor's employee, a resultant action against the gen-
eral contractor, and a consequent claim for indemnification by
the general contractor against the employer under two sepa-
rate contract provisions. First, a standard form subcontract
indemnity clause purported to require that the subcontractor
indemnify the contractor for all damages arising out of work
performed in connection with the subcontract, except damages
caused by the sole negligence of the general contractor. 98 Sec-
ond, the subcontract obligated the subcontractor to assume all
responsibilities owed by the contractor to the owner under the
general contract. The contract required indemnification for
employee injuries and stated that such indemnification would
not be limited by workman's compensation acts or other
employee benefit acts. 99
Reviewing previous Washington decisions on the issue, the
Brown court identified Calkins as setting forth the proper
statement of controlling law on the subject: "Where employers
agree to contract away their immunity under the Act and to
indemnify third parties for employee benefits, such an intent
194. Id. at 364, 674 P.2d at 684; see also Noia, 36 Wash. App. at 16, 671 P.2d at 793.
195. See Bayley Constr., 36 Wash. App. at 364, 674 P.2d at 684, and Noia, 36 Wash.
App. at 16, 671 P.2d at 793; see also Postlewaite Const. Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 106
Wash. 2d 96, 100, 720 P.2d 805, 806-07 (1986) (discussing specificity required to establish
intent).
196. 102 Wash. 2d 235, 684 P.2d 73 (1984).
197. 26 Wash. App. 206, 210, 613 P.2d 143, 145 (1980) (contract did not expressly
provide for indemnity in case of concurrent negligence, and did not expressly waive
lessee's immunity).
198. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 236, 684 P.2d at 74. This clause was virtually identical
to that presented in both Noia, 36 Wash. App. at 13, 671 P.2d at 790, and Bayley
Constr., 36 Wash. App. at 364, 674 P.2d at 684.
199. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 237, 684 P.2d at 74.
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should be clearly expressed in the agreement. ' ' 20 0 Accordingly,
the Washington Supreme Court for the first time articulated
the standard under which such indemnity clauses must be
evaluated:
We hold that an indemnity clause of this type is enforceable
only if it clearly and specifically contains a waiver of the
immunity of the Workman's Compensation Act, either by so
stating or by specifically stating that the indemnitor assumes
potential liability for actions brought by its own
employees.2
0 1
The court then held that the indemnity provision failed to
meet this test and consequently denied indemnification. 2 2
McDowell v. Austin Co.2 ° 3 constitutes the only subsequent
construction industry case applying the Brown rule that relates
to the enforceability of indemnity clauses vis-a-vis the
employer's industrial insurance immunity. A subcontractor's
injured employee sued Austin Co. in McDowell. The general
contractor demanded indemnity against the employer under a
subcontract provision requiring, in relevant part, indemnifica-
tion against liability for personal injuries sustained by any per-
son directly or indirectly employed by the subcontractor or its
subcontractors. 204 Because the language of the clause provided
specifically for suits by the subcontractor's employees, Division
I of the Washington Court of Appeals enforced the provision
under the Brown test, reasoning that "[a]n employer cannot
200. Id. at 239, 684 P.2d at 75, (quoting Calkins v. Lorraine Div. of Koehring Co.,
26 Wash. App. 206, 209, 613 P.2d 143, 145 (1980)).
201. Id. at 239-40, 684 P.2d at 75. In articulating this standard, the decision
specifically modified Brame, Tucci and Northwest Airlines and disapproved Noia and
Bayley, explaining that all of these decisions were inconsistent with the court's present
holding. Id. See also Stocker v. Shell Oil Co., 105 Wash. 2d 546, 549, 716 P.2d 306, 308
(1986) ("To be enforceable against the indemnitor for actions brought by its own
employees, an indemnity agreement must contain express language to that effect.")
202. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 240, 684 P.2d at 75. Similarly, the court rejected the
general contractor's contention that, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the
subcontract provision, the indemnity provision of the main contract, incorporated by
reference into the subcontract, satisfied the standard set by the court. The court held
that the two provisions when read together would create a conflict, and thus there was
an ambiguity between the terms of the subcontract and the main contract. Id. at 241,
684 P.2d at 76. In the case of such a conflict, according to the terms of the subcontract,
the subcontract terms were controlling, and, in any event, such ambiguity would be
resolved most strictly against the drafter, which was, of course, the general contractor.
Id. Finally, the court held that both provisions, read together, failed to clearly express
an intent to waive the employer's industrial insurance immunity. Id.
203. 105 Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985).
204. McDowell, 39 Wash. App. at 445, 693 P.2d at 745.
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agree to indemnify another against suits for injuries sustained
by any person directly or indirectly employed by subcontractor
without intending to waive its immunity under the Industrial
Insurance Act as to those suits."2 ° Thus, an express waiver of
the employer's industrial insurance immunity was not
required.
Notwithstanding the judicial posture of Brown, a degree of
uncertainty continued to exist concerning the specificity
required in indemnity provisions to effectively waive an
employer's industrial insurance immunity. Although Brown
spoke in terms of a clear expression of intent to contract away
industrial insurance immunity, °6 the decision nevertheless
permitted considerable judicial latitude in determining
whether any given provision actually adhered to the articu-
lated standard.20 7 The 1986 statutory amendments to section
4.24.115 of the Revised Code of Washington directly address
this issue and restrict the judicial discretion afforded under
Brown. As amended, the statute specifically provides that a
construction industry indemnity provision "may waive the
indemnitor's immunity under Industrial Insurance, Title 51
RCW, only if the agreement specifically and expressly provides
therefor and the waiver was mutually negotiated by the par-
ties."20 8 In its present form, the revised statute clearly consti-
tutes legislative approval of the Calkins decision,2°9 and
rejection of the holdings of both Noia2 '0  and Bayley
Construction.211
Thus, legislative fiat has effectively settled the issue con-
cerning the degree of specificity required to waive an
employer's industrial insurance immunity in construction
industry indemnity clauses. It is safe to assume that, in
response to the statute, standard form construction contracts
will immediately be revised to reflect and incorporate an
express waiver of industrial insurance immunity. Such an
express waiver, however, does not necessarily address the fur-
205. Id. at 448, 693 P.2d at 747.
206. Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at 239, 684 P.2d at 75.
207. See, e.g., McDowell, 39 Wash. App. at 443, 693 P.2d at 744.
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) (Act of April 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 601, 1986
Wash. Leg. Serv. 6 (West)) [Emphasis added.]
209. 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 (1980).
210. 36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790 (1983).
211. 36 Wash. App. 357, 674 P.2d 679 (1984).
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ther statutory requirement of "mutual negotiation." '2 1 2 Mutual
negotiation introduces an entirely new concept into this issue.
How the courts will respond to this requirement remains open
to question. One viable approach is to analyze and construe the
mutual negotiation requirement analogously to the judicial
doctrine that has developed concerning disclaimers of warran-
ties in consumer sales transactions under the Washington Uni-
form Commercial Code.
2 13
3. Effect of Tort Contribution Statute Upon Employer's
Liability for Indemnification
The 1981 Washington Legislature enacted the Tort and
Products Liability Reform Act, which established a right of
contribution among persons jointly and severably liable for the
same harm.2 14 In an unsurprising development, parties defend-
ing against personal injury claims of injured workmen immedi-
ately began exploring the possibility of using this statute to
maintain actions against employers for contribution, or partial
indemnity, notwithstanding the industrial insurance statute.
At issue was whether a party could maintain such a cause of
action under the tort contribution statute, and, specifically,
whether the new statute overrode the employer immunity pro-
vided by the Industrial Insurance Act.
The issue was squarely presented in Glass v. Stahl Spe-
cialty Co. 2 11 in which an equipment manufacturer sought statu-
tory contribution. The manufacturer alleged that the
employer's concurrent and contributing negligence was a caus-
ative factor in the loss. The court held that the Tort Reform
Act did not extend the right of contribution to permit action
against allegedly negligent employers, thus reaffirming the
strong public policy underlying the exclusive jurisdiction and
the employer immunity concepts of the Industrial Insurance
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) (Act of April 4, 1986, Ch. 305, § 601, 1986
Wash. Leg. Serv. 6 (West)).
213. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-316 (1986). Washington cases construing
this statute have consistently required that a disclaimer of warranties of
merchantibility or fitness in the sale of consumer goods be explicitly negotiated
between the buyer and seller, in addition to the statutory requirement that the sales
agreement set forth with particularity the qualities and characteristics which are not
being warranted in a consumer transaction. See, e.g., Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d
184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971); Thomas v. Ruddell Lease Sales, 43 Wash. App. 208, 716 P.2d
911 (1986).
214. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (1985).
215. 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d 948 (1982).
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Act.216 Fundamentally, the basis for the court's decision was
its clearly correct perception that under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act an employer
cannot be "liable" to an injured employee.217 Accordingly, an
employer does not fall within the category of persons who may
be "jointly and severably liable" for an injury vis-a-vis an
employee. 218 The court refused to read into the Act any such
conclusion absent a specific legislative statement of intent to
require contribution from negligent employers under the Tort
Reform Act.219
B. Negligence of Injured Employee Not Imputed to Employer
so as to Create Indemnity Obligation in an
Otherwise Non-Negligent Employer
As discussed earlier, an indemnitee must allege and prove
that some act or omission of the indemnitor caused, or partici-
pated in causing, the underlying injury for which indemnifica-
tion is sought in order to obtain indemnity under a
construction industry indemnity contract.22 ° In Wickland v.
Gus J. Bouten Construction Co.,2 2 1 the court addressed
whether the negligence of the injured employee could be
imputed to an indemnitor/employer under general principles
of tort law to establish the necessary predicate for enforcement
of the indemnity clause. Wickland concerned the typical
tripartate scenario: a suit by a subcontractor's employee
against the general contractor, and the defendant's claim
against the employer under a broadly worded subcontract
indemnity clause. On the underlying claim, the jury found the
general contractor 75 percent negligent, the injured employee
25 percent negligent, and the employer/subcontractor faultless.
In a subsequent hearing on the third-party indemnity claim,
the court denied enforcement of the clause given the jury's
finding of no negligence on the part of the employer.
The general contractor appealed, contending that the neg-
ligence of the injured employee must be imputed to the
employer to "trigger" the indemnity clause and require an
equal contribution from the employer for the loss sustained by
216. Id. at 888-89, 652 P.2d at 953.
217. Id. at 887, 652 P.2d at 952.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 888-89, 652 P.2d at 952-53.
220. See, e.g., Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115 (1974).
221. 36 Wash. App. 71, 674 P.2d 184 (1983).
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the general contractor in the employee action.222 Reviewing
Jones and the subsequent cases, which increasingly operated to
require causative participation by the employer in the underly-
ing injury, the court rejected the indenitee's argument, stat-
ing as follows: "We do not believe this position reflects the
trend of Washington law. An employer cannot be held to con-
tribution when it has not acted negligently." '223 Acknowledging
the general viability of the doctrines of imputed negligence and
respondeat superior, the court nevertheless noted that these
doctrines only held the controlling party "accountable for the
acts of its agent toward a third party."22 In the situation
presented, the court held that "the employee [had] violated no
duty to a third party, [thus] there [was] no negligence to
impute." '225 Absent imputed negligence, no act or omission of
the employer had contributed to the injury, and the employer
accordingly could not be held to indemnity.226
C. Indemnity for Concurrent Negligence: Specificity and
Clearly Expressed Intent
Indemnity for acts of concurrent or joint negligence is ref-
erenced in various preceding sections of this article,227 but war-
rants further discussion. Washington appellate decisions have
generally been inconsistent in their approach and determina-
tion of the degree of specificity required in the language of an
indemnity clause to trigger indemnification for loss attributa-
ble to the concurrent negligence of the parties.228 Although
the 1986 amendments to the Revised Code of Washington 229
directly address and presumably resolve this issue, a brief
review of the historical development of this issue in the courts
is worthwhile.
In a historical sense, the genesis of indemnity for concur-
rent and joint negligence derives from Griffiths v. Broderick,
222. Id. at 73, 674 P.2d at 185.
223. Id. at 74, 674 P.2d at 187.
224. Id. at 75, 674 P.2d at 187 [emphasis in original].
225. Id.
226. Id. at 76-77, 674 P.2d at 188.
227. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
228. Compare, e.g., Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc., 36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790
(1983) (express provision for concurrent negligence not required) with Calkins v.
Lorraine Div. of Koehring, 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 (1980) (express provision
for concurrent negligence required).
229. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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Inc.2 0 Although Griffiths did not distinguish between indem-
nity for sole negligence and for concurrent negligence, it, at
least, suggested that a broad indemnity clause, by its terms,
required indemnification for losses attributable to the joint
negligence of the indemnitor and the indemnitee.231
Three recent construction industry decisions by the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals directly concern and inconsistently
resolve this issue. In Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc.,232 the court
determined that "an express provision for concurrent negli-
gence is [not] required to create an enforceable contractual
right to indemnity. The agreement need only clearly express
an intent to provide for indemnification. '23 3 In Calkins v. Lor-
raine Division of Koehring,2  however, the court reached a
conflicting conclusion, holding that an indemnity provision
must expressly provide for "indemnity where [the parties]
were concurrently negligent." 235 Finally, in McDowell v. Aus-
tin Co.,236 Division I of the court of appeals expressly rejected
the Calkins holding and denied that "an intent to indemnify
against concurrent negligence must be clearly expressed in
order for an indemnity agreement to be enforceable against an
employer. 2 37  The court concluded that a general and all
inclusive expression of intent to indemnify for losses attributa-
ble to the negligence of the indemnitee included indemnity for
acts of concurrent negligence.238
At the Washington Supreme Court level, two very recent
decisions strongly indicate a judicial trend toward requiring a
greater degree of specificity in the language of indemnity pro-
visions before imposing liability for damages attributable to the
concurrent negligence of the parties. In Northwest Airlines v.
Hughes Air Corp.,239 the court interpreted an indemnity provi-
230. 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
231. Id. at 905-07, 182 P.2d at 21-2.
232. 36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790.
233. Id. at 16, 671 P.2d at 791-92. Although Noia was overruled by Brown, 102
Wash. 2d at 235, 684 P.2d at 73, insofar as the issue of a waiver of industrial insurance
immunity was concerned, the Brown decision did not address this second aspect of the
Noia decision.
234. 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 (1980).
235. Id. at 210, 613 P.2d at 145.
236. 39 Wash. App. 443, 693 P.2d 744, aff'd, 105 Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985).
237. Id. at 450, 693 P.2d at 749.
238. Id. The court also noted that Brown had not addressed this aspect of the
Noia decision.
239. 104 Wash. 2d 152, 702 P.2d 1192 (1985). The appeal arose in the context of the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the lessee, which effectively
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sion in a commercial lease agreement. The issue was whether
the indemnity provision was unenforceable as against public
policy because it operated to require indemnification for dam-
ages attributable to the sole negligence of the indemnitee.24 °
Tracing the chronology of Washington case law construing
indemnification provisions, the court acknowledged previous
holdings to the effect that "it was not against public policy for
parties to enter into indemnity agreements in commercial
leases whereby one party contractually agrees to indemnify, to
be financially responsible for the other party's negligence. '"241
The court acknowledged Griffiths for the proposition that a
broad-form indemnification clause historically operated to
require indemnification for the negligence of the indemni-
tee.242 However, the court suggested that this approach no
longer represented the state of the law, noting that "Washing-
ton currently requires.., that more specific language be used
to evidence a clear and unequivocal intention to indemnify the
indemnitee's own negligence. "243 The court concluded by
affirming the principle that indemnification for one's own neg-
ligence does not violate public policy per se, yet strongly sug-
gested that a stricter standard would apply in the future:
Clearly, these rules do not say that indemnification clauses
are void as against public policy or that, as a matter of law,
an indemnitor cannot be held responsible for an indemni-
tee's sole negligence. What these rules require is that, for an
indemnitor to be responsible for the indemnitee's own negli-
gence, the agreement must be clearly spelled-out.244
The second and final Washington Supreme Court decision
on this issue, though consistent with earlier case law in terms
denied enforcement of the provision. Id. at 153, 702 P.2d at 1193. On an intermediate
appellate level, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. 37 Wash. App. 344, 679 P.2d 968 (1984). The effect of the Washington Supreme
Court's decision was to affirm the court of appeals decision. 104 Wash. 2d at 153, 702
P.2d at 1193.
240. Northwest Airlines, 104 Wash. 2d at 158, 702 P.2d at 1193. Because the case
arose outside the context of a construction contract, the provisions of WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.115 (1986), which would have otherwise invalidated the provision, were
inapplicable.
241. Northwest Airlines, 104 Wash. 2d at 154, 702 P.2d at 1193.
242. Id. at 155. 702 P.2d at 1193-94.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 157-58, 702 P.2d at 1194. Although Northwest Airlines stopped short of
expressly disapproving the lower appellate court decisions in Noia and McDowell on
this issue, or expressly approving the principle enunciated in Calkins, it did, at a
minimum, suggest that the latter decision represented a correct statement of the law.
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of result, represented a fundamental change in the court's ana-
lytical approach to this issue. Previous decisions analyzed the
issue exclusively in terms of public policy.245 McDowell v. Aus-
tin Co.,246 however, represented a departure from this
approach and predicated the issues resolution upon a "notice"
analysis.247  McDowell concerned an indemnity provision
"against all liability.., caused.., by an act or omission, negli-
gent or otherwise, by . . . [the general contractor]. 248 The
appellant [indemnitor] argued that the provision was ambigu-
ous on the issue of indemnification for concurrent negligence,
and was consequently unenforceable because the provision
failed to clearly express an intent to indemnify for concurrent
negligence. 249 This argument was predicated upon Calkins,
which disfavored indemnification for liability resulting from
one's own negligence, and upon Calkins requirement that such
agreements are enforceable only if expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms.250
Although the court acknowledged that earlier decisions
supported Calkins' disfavor of contracts that required indem-
nity for a party's own negligence251 and cited the general rule
that such indemnity obligations be "expressed in clear and
unequivocal terms, ' 252 the court noted a long-standing prefer-
ence toward enforcement of indemnity agreements as executed
by the parties. 253 The court resolved the conflict between these
principles by examining the purpose of the rule requiring spec-
ificity in the language of the indemnification provision: "At
least one court stated that the purpose of this rule is to prevent
injustice, and to insure that a contracting party has fair notice
that a large and ruinous award can be assessed against it solely
by reason of negligence attributable to the other contracting
245. See Northwest Airlines, 104 Wash. 2d at 152, 702 P.2d at 1192; see, e.g.,
Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947).
246. 105 Wash. 2d at 48, 710 P.2d at 192.
247. For additional discussion of McDowell, see supra notes 129-51 and
accompanying text.
248. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 53, 710 P.2d at 194.
249. Id. at 50, 710 P.2d at 193.
250. Id. at 52, 710 P.2d at 194.
251. Id. at 52, 710 P.2d at 194. Both Jones v. Strom Const. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518,
527 P.2d 18 (1974) and Griffiths, 27 Wash. 2d at 901, 182 P.2d at 18 were cited in
support of this proposition.
252. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 53, 710 P.2d at 194.
253. Id. at 53-54, 710 P.2d at 195. Specific reliance for this second proposition was
predicated on Griffiths, 27 Wash. 2d at 901, 182 P.2d at 18, and upon Redford v. Seattle,
94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980).
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party. 2 5 4 Accordingly, under the umbrella of "fair notice"
analysis, the court enforced the parties' agreement, holding
that the provision "provided fair notice to [the employer] that
it would be liable for 'all liability' to [its] employees caused by
[the general contractor's] conduct. '255 Thus, express reference
to "concurrent negligence" was not required where the provi-
sion itself expressly provided indemnification against liability
attributable to the indemnitee's own negligence.25 6 In this situ-
ation, the Calkins' rule was "not necessary for notifying [the
employer] of its role as insurer for the indemnitee's
liability., 257
At best, the recent consecutive decisions handed down in
Noia, Calkins, Northwest Airlines, and McDowell resulted in
continued uncertainty in the state of the law and certainly
failed to definitively resolve this issue. On one hand, McDow-
ell can be read for the proposition that a broad indemnity pro-
vision includes indemnity for acts of concurrent negligence.25 8
At a minimum, this conclusion is derived analytically from the
result. On the other hand, because McDowell approves the
principles enunciated in Northwest Airlines and refuses to
expressly disapprove or overrule Calkins, a case can be made
for the proposition that inclusion of clear, express, and une-
quivocal language relating to concurrent negligence is required
in most circumstances. 5 9 In any event, the issue continued to
require definitive resolution.
This resolution was forthcoming from the legislature with
the enactment of the 1986 amendments to section 4.24.115260 of
the Revised Code of Washington. By legislative fiat, a current
indemnity agreement, which purports to indemnify against the
parties' concurrent negligence "is valid and enforceable only to
the extent of the indemnitor's negligence and only if the agree-
254. McDowell, 105 Wash. 2d at 53, 710 P.2d at 195 (citing Joe Adams & Sons v.
McCann Const. Co., 475 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. 1971)) [emphasis added]. Although the
quoted language speaks in terms of "sole negligence," it has obvious application to
situations involving indemnification for losses attributable to the concurrent





259. Id. at 52-53, 710 P.2d at 194.
260. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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ment specifically and expressly provides therefore ... ."26' In
substance, the amended statute represents legislative approval
of the Calkins decision, and an implicit legislative disapproval
of Noia. It is a safe assumption that the construction industry
will react to the 1986 statutory amendments by revising the
standard subcontract forms to specifically include an obligation
to indemnify for losses attributable to concurrent negligence.
D. Allocation or Apportionment of Loss
With the original enactment of section 4.24.115 of the
Revised Code of Washington in 1967,262 most standard form
provisions in construction contracts excluded liability for dam-
ages attributable to the sole negligence of the indemnitee.2 6 3
Although less commonly encountered, and most often in the
context of a general contract, some indemnity provisions con-
tinued to exclude liability for damages attributable to the neg-
ligence of the indemnitee.2 64  Although seemingly
inconsequential, the inclusion of an exception for sole negli-
gence as opposed to an exception for negligence drastically
affected the liabilities of the parties to the agreement. The dis-
tinction arose in connection with the apportionment of
damages.
Under Washington case law, an indemnity provision
excepting liability for the negligence of the indemnitee
required apportionment of liability based upon the parties' rel-
ative fault.2 6 5 On the other hand, indemnity provisions except-
ing liability only for the sole negligence of the indemnitee did
not require apportionment.2 6 6 In effect, the latter provision
was an all or nothing proposition. That is, under an indemnity
provision excepting liability only for the indemnitee's sole neg-
ligence, the burden of proof was upon the indemnitee to estab-
lish that some negligence by the indemnitor, however minimal
or attenuated,267 contributed to the injury. In terms of per-
261. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986) (emphasis added). See supra text
accompanying note 157.
262. See supra text accompanying note 155.
263. See, e.g., Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc., 36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790 (1983).
264. See, e.g., Redford v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980).
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Noia, 36 Wash. App. at 16-17, 671 P.2d at 793.
267. For example, a case recently litigated by the author involved an allegation by
the indemnitee that the indemnitor's negligence included a failure to specifically warn
its employees on the date of the accident that "they should be careful of falling
objects" on a multi-employer high-rise construction project, notwithstanding the
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centages, such negligence may have been 50 percent or 10 per-
cent or 1 percent-the degree was immaterial. Once the
indemnitor's concurrent negligence was established, the
indemnitor was held to indemnification for the full extent of
the loss.
268
Again, the 1986 amendments to section 4.24.115269 of the
Revised Code of Washington bear directly upon this specific
issue, and, in substance, legislatively mandate an apportion-
ment of damages, regardless of whether the indemnity provi-
sion reads in terms of negligence or sole negligence. The
statutory amendments specifically retain language that invali-
dates any indemnity agreement purporting to require indemni-
fication for losses attributable to the sole negligence of the
indemnitee.2 7 0 The amended statute, however, provides addi-
tional protection to indemnitors in that it further mandates
that a construction industry indemnity provision "is valid and
enforceable only to the extent of the indemnitor's negli-
gence ' in circumstances involving the concurrent negligence
of the parties. 2  Both as a practical matter and from a stand-
point of equity, the 1986 statutory amendments represent a
positive resolution of this issue.
E. Reciprocal Indemnification Clauses
The judicial construction and enforcement of a unique
reciprocal indemnity provision occurred in Prociw v. Baugh
Construction Co.2 73 The indemnity provision required mutual
indemnification between the contractor and subcontractor for
losses and damages arising out of each parties' performance of
its respective subcontract obligations. The court faced the task
undisputed testimony that all of the employees, including the injured party, were at all
times fully aware of this danger as a general rule on such projects.
268. See, e.g., Noia, 36 Wash. App. at 16-17, 671 P.2d at 793.
269. See supra text accompanying note 157.
270. Id.
271. See supra text accompanying note 155.
272. Id. On its face, the statute does not appear to address a situation wherein the
loss is attributable to the negligence of the indemnitor and a third-party subcontractor,
absent any contributory negligence of the indemnitee. Under such circumstances, in a
contract action the indemnitee would arguably be entitled to seek full indemnification
from a single indemnitor, notwithstanding this indemnitor's limited causal
participation in the fact of injury. Of course, a claim for contribution may exist as
between the culpable parties. See, e.g., Karnatz v. Murphy Pac. Corp., 8 Wash. App. 76,
503 P.2d 1145 (1972). For a discussion of Karnatz, see inkfra text accompanying notes
275-278.
273. 9 Wash. App. 750, 515 P.2d 518 (1973).
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of applying the indemnity clause to a loss caused by the joint
negligence of the indemnitee and indemnitor. Faced with this
situation, the court required an equal apportionment of dam-
ages between the joint and reciprocal indemnitors, without
regard for the proportion of negligence attributable to each.274
Although analytically suspect and obviously result oriented,
the court's decision appears equitable under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case.
F. Liability of Independent Indemnitors of
a Common Obligation
A unique set of circumstances also occurred in Karnatz v.
Murphy Pacific Corp.275 in which two separate contractors
were allegedly liable under separate contractual indemnity
provisions. The court rejected allocating or apportioning dam-
ages based upon the comparative fault of the indemnitors and
held each indemnitor liable for one-half of the amount for
which recovery was sought. Analogizing the situation to com-
mon law contribution, the court noted that the doctrine,
although founded in equity, applied equally with respect to
contract obligationsY Since neither indemnity provision
"contemplated the existence of the other, [n]or provided for
apportionment of liability for costs in the event of multiple
coverage[,] ... neither indemnitor had the primary obligation
... ,277 Thus, the doctrine of contribution required equal
apportionment of the loss.
27 8
G. Negligence of Third-Party Subcontractor
A common situation occurs when the underlying loss,
injury or damage is attributable, not to the negligence of the
indemnitee/general contractor, but to the sole negligence of a
third-party subcontractor on the project. For a variety of rea-
sons, the general contractor may elect not to proceed directly
against the third-party subcontractor, but instead may elect to
bring an action against the employer of the injured party.279
274. Id. at 754, 515 P.2d at 520-51.
275. 8 Wash. App. 76, 503 P.2d 1145 (1972).
276. Id. at 82, 503 P.2d at 1148.
277. Id. at 81-82, 503 P.2d at 1148.
278. Id. at 82, 503 P.2d at 1148.
279. Liability in such circumstances is generally predicated upon the allegation
that the employee injury "resulted from, arose out of, in connection with, or incident
to" the employer's performance of the subcontract. The nature and substance of the
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Jones and its progeny appear to foreclose this possibility. This
conclusion follows from the functional effect of the Jones overt
act or omission test and from the express language of the deci-
sion. That is, Jones specifically holds that a form indemnity
provision does not require indemnification "as against any and
all losses or damages . . . as a direct and sole result of [the
indemnitee's], or another of its subcontractor's, negligence in
the performance of duties ... 280
H. Third-Party Cause of Action
Absent a manifest intent in the language of the agree-
ment, a third-party has no direct cause of action against an
indemnitor under a construction contract indemnity agree-
ment.281 In Simons v. Tri-State Construction Co.282 a home-
owner sought damages from an underground utilities
contractor for the City of Hoquiam alleging removal of lateral
support as a result of construction activities. No evidence of
any negligence on the part of the contractor existed, and all
work was performed in compliance with the city's plans and
specifications. The court rejected the plaintiff's theory that
the indemnity provision of the contract between the contractor
and the city created a direct cause of action against the indem-
nitor and found, instead, that the contractor's compliance with
the city's plans and specifications for the project obviated any
direct liability on its part.2 8 3 In addition, the court found no
evidence to support a third-party beneficiary theory of contract
liability. Consequently, the indemnity agreement ran only to
the city and required that the city be directly indemnified for
liability claims, losses, and damages. 28 4  The court left
unresolved the issue of any potential claim by the city for
indemnity against the contractor by means of an appropriate
cross-claim or independent action.28 5
allegation derives from the still prevalent broad language of construction industry
indemnity provisions.
280. Jones v. Strom Constr. Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d 1115 (1974) (emphasis
added). But cf. McDowell v. Austin Co., 39 Wash. App. 443, 693 P.2d 774, affl'd, 105
Wash. 2d 48, 710 P.2d 192 (1985).
281. Simons v. Tri-State Constr. Co., 33 Wash. App. 315, 655 P.2d 703 (1982).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 325, 655 P.2d at 707-08.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 326, 655 P.2d at 708.
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I. Recovery of Attorney Fees in Action Seeking Enforcement
of Indemnity C7ause
Various indemnity cases discuss the recovery of attorney
fees under a typical general contractual provision, which
allows the prevailing party an award of attorney fees in an
action upon the contract. The Jones case conclusively resolved
this issue when the court held, as a matter of first impression,
that "in the absence of express contractual terms to the con-
trary, an indemnitee may not recover legal fees incurred in
establishing his right to indemnification. ' 286 Attorney fees
expended in establishing or defending against a claim to
indemnification, however, should not be confused with an
allowance of such fees for the defense of the claim indemnified
against. Under a properly worded indemnity provision, and
assuming entitlement to indemnification, an indemnitee is
allowed as an element of damages the amount of attorney fees
expended in defense of the claim for which indemnification is
sought.217 Only in third-party or independent actions seeking
indemnification are attorneys' fees disallowed absent express
contract terms to the contrary.8 8
IV. DRAFTING THE MODEL CLAUSE
In view of the high costs of litigation, it is of obvious bene-
fit to owners, prime contractors and subcontractors to include
in their contracts an indemnity provision free from ambiguity.
It is also beneficial that a provision be consistent with the prin-
ciples governing indemnity clauses in construction industry
contracts both as articulated by the courts and as determined
by the legislative amendments to section 4.24.11529 of the
Revised Code of Washington. The following proposed model
indemnity provision addresses many of the issues involved in
the interpretation and application of indemnity provisions that
have been considered by the courts and affected by the revised
statute. To a large extent, the language and format of the pro-
posed clause is adopted from subparagraph (k) of the Associ-
ated General Contractor subcontract form. The language of
the AGC provision, however, has been amended to reflect and
286. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 523, 527 P.2d at 1119.
287. See Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 905-07, 182 P.2d 18, 21-
22 (1947).
288. See Tri-M Erectors v. Drake Co., 27 Wash. App. 529, 618 P.2d 1341 (1980).
289. See supra and accompanying text 157.
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incorporate principles of current Washington law, and repre-
sents a fair and equitable allocation of liability in construction
industry contracts. With this in mind, a model clause is pro-
posed as follows:
INDEMNIFICATION
The Subcontractor agrees to indemnify and save harm-
less the Contractor, its officers, agents and employees, from
and against any and all suits, claims, actions, losses, costs,
penalties, and damages of whatsoever kind or nature, includ-
ing attorney fees, arising out of, in connection with, or inci-
dent to the work of this Subcontract, except to the extent
caused by the negligence of the Contractor and/or an
independent third-party Subcontractor on the project, even
though some act or omission, negligent or otherwise, of the
Contractor may also be a cause of the loss or damage. In the
event of litigation between the parties to enforce the rights
under this paragraph, reasonable attorney fees shall be
allowed to the prevailing party. This indemnification obliga-
tion shall include, but is not limited to, all claims against the
Contractor by an employee or former employee of the Sub-
contractor, and the Subcontractor expressly waives all
immunity and limitation on liability under any Industrial
Insurance Act, other worker's compensation act, disability
benefit act, or other employee benefit act of any jurisdiction
which would otherwise be applicable in the case of such a
claim.
This proposed clause directly addresses specific issues and
problems arising in the context of litigation on this issue.
Although not necessarily in order within the language of the
clause, the following issues are considered.
First, the provision contains an express waiver of the
employer's industrial insurance immunity, which is without
question sufficient to meet the standards enunciated in
Brown 290 and the recent amendments to section 4.24.115291 of
the Revised Code of Washington.
Second, the clause contains an express provision for an
award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to
enforce indemnification. Such fees would otherwise be disal-
lowed under Jones292 and Tri-M Erectors.293
290. Brown v. Prime Const. Co., 102 Wash. 2d 235, 684 P.2d 73 (1984). See supra
notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
291. See supra text and accompanying note 157.
292. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 518, 527 P.2d at 1115.
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Third, the clause complies with the statutory prohibition
against indemnification for damages attributable to the sole
negligence of the indemnitee.294 In accord with the 1986 statu-
tory amendments,295 the clause requires the apportioning of
liability between the general contractor and subcontractor
based upon their comparative fault. This conclusion, of course,
derives from the exception for indemnification liability predi-
cated upon the "negligence" of the contractor, as opposed to
the more commonly encountered language excepting only the
"sole negligence" of the contractor.296
Fourth, by also excepting liability for loss attributable to
the negligence of a third-party subcontractor, the clause effec-
tively qualifies and limits the liability of the indemnitor to
losses and damages caused by his own acts or omissions.
Although this language certainly goes beyond the strict hold-
ing of the Jones decision, which speaks only of the sole negli-
gence of third-party subcontractors,297 the language is clearly
consistent with the spirit of Jones. In any event, the language
recognizes the practical realities inherent in a multi-employer
construction project.
Finally, the clause specifically obligates indemnity for acts
of joint or concurrent negligence, and thus conforms to the
standards of the 1986 legislative amendments to section
4.24.115298 of the Revised Code of Washington.
V. CONCLUSION
The interpretation and enforcement of construction indus-
try indemnity provisions are well delineated in Washington
case law. Analysis of the historical progression of Washington
case law reveals a judicial trend toward imparting to these
clauses a just and equitable interpretation that accords with
the realities of major multi-employer construction projects.299
In general, the courts have consistently recognized principles
associated with freedom of contract between the parties to
293. Tri-M Erectors, 27 Wash. 2d at 529, 618 P.2d at 1341. See supra notes 286-88
and accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.
294. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.155 (1985).
295. See supra text accompanying note 157.
296. See supra notes 264-74 and accompanying text.
297. Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 522, 527 P.2d at 1118.
298. See supra text accompanying note 157.
299. See, e.g., Jones, 84 Wash. 2d at 518, 527 P.2d at 1115.
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such agreements.300 Nevertheless, a conspicuous trend in the
cases requires an increasing degree of specificity in the lan-
guage of indemnity provisions to precipitate or trigger an obli-
gation to indemnify under circumstances that would otherwise
not entail common law liability.3 ' This judicial trend has
received express legislative approval in the recent 1986 amend-
ments to section 4.24.115302 of the Revised Code of Washington.
The following principles are now mandated by case law
and statute. A party may not receive indemnification for losses
attributable to its sole negligence. 0 Indemnification may not
be enforced against an employer absent an express and specific
waiver of the industrial insurance immunity to which the
employer would otherwise be entitled,3° and such waiver must
be "mutually negotiated" 305 by the parties. Similarly, liability
to indemnify for losses attributable to the concurrent negli-
gence of the parties also requires specific and express language
providing therefor.0 6 Moreover, the obligation to indemnify
for losses attributable to the joint negligence of the parties is
limited to the extent that the indemnitor's negligence causally
participated in the underlying loss.
Insofar as future litigation is concerned, there will
undoubtedly arise new and unforeseen issues that will affect
the future interpretation, application, and development of con-
struction industry indemnification clauses.0 7 As a general
rule, cases concerning the enforcement of these clauses involve
300. See, e.g., Stocker v. Shell Oil Co., 105 Wash. 2d 546, 716 P.2d 306 (1986); Cope
v. J.K. Campbell & Assoc., 71 Wash. 2d 453, 429 P.2d 124 (1967).
301. See, e.g., Stocker, 105 Wash. 2d at 546, 716 P.2d at 306; Calkins v. Lorraine Div.
of Koehring, 26 Wash. App. 206, 613 P.2d 143 (1980).
302. See supra text accompanying note 157.
303. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1985).
304. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986). See supra note and accompanying text
157. See also Stocker, 105 Wash. 2d at 549-0, 716 P.2d at 309; Brown, 102 Wash. 2d at
239, 684 P.2d at 76.
305. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986). See also supra notes 215-218 and
accompanying text.
306. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115 (1986). See also Calkins, 26 Wash. App. at 206,
613 P.2d at 143.
307. For example, the contractual liability of an indemnitor tofully indemnify for
losses attributable to the concurrent negligence of the indenitor and a third party is
not specifically addressed by the recent amendments to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115
(1985). See supra note 278. Although the Jones analysis regarding the indemnitor's
causal participation in the loss, and the "spirit" of the recent statutory amendments
suggest that the indemnitor's liability should, under any circumstances, be limited to




substantial damages, which alone often provides the impetus
for continued litigation. In addition, the unique facts of these
cases increases the likelihood that the courts will continue to
be asked to resolve these issues. Finally, creative or sloppy (the
distinction will depend upon the perception of the parties)
drafting of the indemnification clause will inevitably lead to
further litigation as the parties attempt to enhance their
respective positions vis-a-vis liability and attempt to incorpo-
rate recent judicial pronouncements and the statutory amend-
ments into their contracts. Continued litigation on this subject
is unavoidable, and future clarifications and refinements of
existing principles of law must be anticipated. Nevertheless,
both the majority of recent Washington decisions and the
recent statutory amendments to section 4.24.115 of the Revised
Code of Washington provide consistent guidance and direction
toward resolving issues concerning construction industry
indemnity clauses in most foreseeable circumstances.
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